

**The Administration of Intelligence  
In The Department of State**

**VOLUME I—SUMMARY REPORT**

State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

**MAY 1952**

26

CRESAP, McCORMICK and PAGET

NEW YORK - CHICAGO

*Management Engineers*

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May 15, 1952

Hon. Carlisle H. Humelsine  
Deputy Under Secretary - Administration  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Humelsine:

We have completed and transmit herewith Volume I which comprises a summary report of our findings in connection with "The Administration of Intelligence in the Department of State." The authority for the study was Purchase Order DIC R 168297 negotiated on November 13, 1951 with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, under the terms of its contract No. SCC 14123 with you. Prior to the final preparation of the accompanying document, its contents were reviewed with officials of your office, of the R Area of the Department, and of the M.I.T., Center for International Studies.

We are pleased to report that we have found in the Department a vigorous Intelligence organization whose services, both to the Department and to the Intelligence community at large, have been progressively strengthened during the past seven years. It has been our objective to search out opportunities for contributing to continued progress in this regard. To this end, a fivefold program of improvements has been developed centering around:

Improvements in consumer relations

Improvements in the utilization of research analysts

Improvements in planning and control

Simplification of principal work operations

Refinements in the organization structure

Supplementing this summary report is Volume II, "Reference and Installation Manual," which provides the detail required to act upon the suggestions offered.

It has been an honor to serve the Department in an area of such high importance to our foreign relations and national welfare. We will be pleased to discuss this report further with interested officials and to render additional consulting services to the Department.

Very truly yours,

*Cresap, McCormick and Paget*

CRESAP, McCORMICK and PAGET

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# **The Administration of Intelligence In The Department of State**

## **VOLUME I—SUMMARY REPORT**

**MAY 1952**

## FORMAT OF THE REPORT

This report of survey has been prepared in two volumes to facilitate its reading and use by the total audience to which it may be of interest:

**VOLUME I** - Is a Summary Report consisting of a concise outline of principal findings and of "recommendations in principle." This format has been chosen to permit rapid reading or scanning by those whose interest is with the general content and the total scope of the study. Its purpose is thus to provide quick perspective rather than details of organization and procedure.

**VOLUME II** - Is a Reference and Installation Manual designed for more intensive study and reference by those who will have direct responsibility for installation action. It is so constructed that each of its 20 chapters is a self-contained unit which can be separately distributed to those whose interest centers in one or a few subjects, rather than in the whole body of recommendations.

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## QUESTIONS SUGGESTED BY NSC DIRECTIVES

### STATE'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE FIELDS OF ITS DOMINANT INTEREST

One directive provides that steps be taken to minimize independent intelligence production by any agency in the fields of dominant interest assigned to another. It further provides that agencies exchange information and plans. In the case of one field of intelligence, the agency of dominant interest is given explicit responsibilities to

- Review requirements, facilities and arrangements.
- Insure that full knowledge and talent is applied.
- Evaluate pertinence, extent, quality of data and develop ways of improving.
- Conduct common service research to supplement production of other agencies and fill requests of IAC.

Question: Does State Department have any of the above responsibilities in its fields of dominant interest? If so, should it take more active steps to exercise coordination and provide leadership, especially in view of the 1951 transfer of responsibilities from CIA?

### THE EXTENT TO WHICH STATE DEPARTMENT RECEIVES OR SHOULD SEEK LEADERSHIP AND GUIDANCE FROM THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Director of Central Intelligence is charged by one directive with responsibility for developing comprehensive objectives to guide the collection and production of National Intelligence. He is also charged with the conduct of such surveys and inspections of Departmental intelligence materials as he deems necessary to advise the NSC and make recommendations for the coordination of intelligence activities.


Question: Is such leadership and guidance provided in sufficient degree? Should the Department seek more guidance with particular emphasis upon assessing the adequacy of production in relation to Departmental and National needs? Is the current balance between Basic Intelligence production on the one hand and Current Staff Intelligence on the other hand, optimum?

### THE EXTENT TO WHICH R RECEIVES OR SHOULD SEEK GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FROM WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT ITSELF

One directive specifies that Departmental Intelligence is that needed by a Department, and the subordinate units thereof, to execute its mission and discharge its lawful responsibilities. Current Intelligence is defined as that of immediate interest and value to operating and policy staffs. Staff Intelligence is to be produced as each department shall require.

Question: Is R alone responsible for determining what is "of interest and value" to operating and policy officers? If not, should more satisfactory means of securing such guidance be sought? Should steps be taken to secure more active consideration by top policy levels of the adequacy of R's staffing and facilities in relation to departmental needs for current and staff intelligence?

# HOW DO R EXECUTIVES SPEND THEIR TIME?



## DISTRIBUTION OF TIME OF DIVISION CHIEFS

Division	Percent of Time Devoted to Following			
	Working with Subordinates	Budget and Personnel	Conferences and Meetings	Reading, Review and Writing
DRA	42%	12%	34%	12%
DRF (Yager)	20	7	55	18
DRS	40	8	20	32
DRW	8	19	46	27
DFI	23	21	27	29
IAD	20	14	46	20
BI	26	13	37	24
LR	28	10	32	30
(Data on DRN not available)				

## **INTRODUCTION**

- **THE CHALLENGE**
- **THE SIX PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF ADMINISTRATION**
- **PROJECT RESEARCH FROM FOUR DISTINCT VIEWPOINTS**
- **THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THIS STUDY**

## THE CHALLENGE

George S. Pettes in his "The Future Of American Secret Intelligence" observes:

"The administration of intelligence has been backward partly because the administration of research is generally backward. In spite of shining examples to the contrary, there are extraordinarily many of those who are engaged in research, and even of those who direct it, who cannot see the task as a series of definite operations. This book . . . takes the opposite view; that research processes are by nature as susceptible to the arts of management as any other human activity. If this is not so there is little reason to ponder the subject, for nothing can be done to improve it."

WHAT DOES THE TERM "ADMINISTRATION" ENCOMPASS IN  
THIS FIELD OF INTELLIGENCE?

## **SIX PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE FIELD OF INTELLIGENCE**

The first eight weeks (Dec. 3 - Jan. 28) were devoted to extensive interviews throughout the R Area (112 individuals) to identify the major tasks of those who administer the functions. These tasks may be broadly classified in six categories:

### **1. MEASUREMENT OF DEMAND AND USE**

Management must devise and apply techniques of (1) identifying the extent of current demand for and use of intelligence products and services, (2) securing reactions as to the quality and timeliness of the products, and (3) seeking information as to how the entire range of intelligence services can be made more useful. It can be argued that the communication of intelligence is as important as its production.

### **2. PROGRAM PLANNING AND CONTROL**

The direction and content of the research program must be governed by some form of advance planning if the organization is to anticipate needs and respond adequately to valid demands. Likewise, the tempo of research and production must be stimulated by the application of realistic schedules.

### **3. ACQUISITION OF DATA REQUIRED FOR INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH**

To assure the inflow of regular and special data required for intelligence research, means must be developed to assess the coverage being obtained, and steps taken to improve the quality and quantity of reporting, as well as to exploit all fruitful sources.

### **4. PREPARATION OF THE FINISHED PRODUCT**

The analyst corps, representing the most valuable asset of the Intelligence Organization, must be provided the environment and the stimuli which will produce a sustained rate of high quality performance. The physical product must be so presented and packaged as to secure maximum recognition and readership by the target audience.

### **5. SUPPORTING SERVICES**

To facilitate the work of the substantive producers of Intelligence, management must establish and operate supporting services concerned with (1) the receipt and distribution of raw materials, (2) the reproduction and dissemination of finished products, (3) the procurement and administration of personnel and funds, (4) the furnishing of physical facilities (space, equipment, supplies, etc.).

### **6. ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING**

Finally, the distribution of authority and responsibility must be such as to assure maximum use of the skills of administrators, analysts and support personnel working as a team.

## PROJECT RESEARCH FROM FOUR DISTINCT VIEWPOINTS

Following identification of the components warranting examination, intensive "project research" was conducted. For eight weeks R was observed through four pairs of eyes:

### FIRST, THROUGH THE EYES OF R's ADMINISTRATORS

1. Systematic information was obtained by personal contact with 77 supervisory officials, representing all segments of R, with regard to: Internal organization, staffing, budget, workload, procedures, physical facilities, principal problems.
2. "On the job" analyses of 68 supervisors were secured through the medium of a daily diary maintained by each supervisor for a period of five consecutive days.
3. A detailed understanding of research workload was obtained in four branches; and a scheme of planning and scheduling research tasks was tested in collaboration with these branch chiefs.

### SECOND, THROUGH THE EYES OF R's PRODUCERS— THE ANALYSTS

Observation interviews were held with 49 analysts. Of this group, 24 were selected in cooperation with division chiefs for an extended discussion (4 hours average) during which 47 questions were reviewed on a frank, off-the-record basis:

- Who he is, how he was selected
- How he works
- What he does
- What obstacles he finds
- What his expectations are for the future.

In addition, six analysts kept a five-day log of activities.

### THIRD, THROUGH THE EYES OF R's CUSTOMERS

Originally rather limited sampling of consumer reaction was planned. Initial bureau contacts revealed that this approach would be unproductive due to extreme variations in the understanding and use of R's services. An extensive coverage was finally obtained through 224 interviews covering:


- What services are used (oral, written; spot, in depth)
- How services are procured (formally, informally; directly, indirectly)
- Evaluation of services received (timeliness, quality, readability)
- Probable future use of R's services and conditions conducive to full use.

In addition to Bureau interviews, 26 officials were contacted in other top activities, and visits were made to CIA, A-2, G-2, ONI, PSB, and Bureau of Budget.

### FOURTH, THROUGH OUR OWN TECHNIQUES OF ANALYSIS

Facts and opinions of others have served to focus our attention on many aspects of organization, procedures and facilities. Particular attention has been given in these analyses to (1) acquisition procedures, (2) document processing both in OIR and BI, (3) report format and presentation, (4) effective utilization of executive time and skills, and (5) ways of improving physical factors. Past reports and R/ES files have been invaluable.

# 457 INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED DURING SURVEY



## POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THIS STUDY

To the layman considering the subject for the first time, the intelligence function in the State Department presents an appearance of complexity and virtually unlimited scope. Under its charter from the NSC and the Department, the R Area is called upon to render services ranging from simple fact servicing, through the procurement of raw data and the provision of librarial services, to the highest intellectual act of intelligence estimating, within its assigned fields. Thus, at any given time its audience may vary from a Desk Officer who requires a single document or an answer to a single specific question, to a major estimate of importance to the entire Intelligence Community. Its products are in part specifically requested, in part suggested by general questions raised, and in part self-initiated. Its tempo and rate of work vary from daily deadlines and spot briefings to long-range studies for which months can and should be allowed.

This extreme range of services and conditions of service leads inevitably to two questions:

Can the mission of the intelligence function in the Department be so precisely defined as to provide criteria which can be readily applied in judging the adequacy and appropriateness of functions performed?

- Can management be assured through such criteria that the size and composition of the Intelligence Organization is directly related to known and demonstrated needs?

It is the conclusion of this inquiry that an attempt to define all-inclusive criteria, (at least at this point in the evolution of the intelligence function in the Department) would result in artificial concepts incapable of meaningful application by the areas of management directly concerned; namely, the producers, the consumers and those responsible for personnel ceilings and budget justifications. It has been concluded, however, that all of these interests can be satisfied by the application of sound principles of administration which will subject the intelligence program, and every part of the program, to systematic self-assessment and inspection on a continuing basis, in order to evaluate the extent to which it meets the basic tests of validity, need, demand and use. It is thus a principal objective of this study to identify the vehicles and techniques through which this can be accomplished.

## PART ONE

### A—THE CONSUMER REACTION ANALYSIS

#### METHOD OF STUDY

Personal interviews, using prepared questionnaire, soliciting answers as follows:


- Is R Used?
- Is R Useful?
- Is R's Setting In State Department Organization Acceptable?
- Can OIR Be of Greater Service?

#### COVERAGE AND VALIDITY


1. All Bureaus covered plus the Fifth Floor Level (C, G, S/P, S/S).
2. Total of 175 recordable interviews reaching 224 individuals.
3. All Bureau Offices with exception of Motion Picture and Educational Exchange.
4. All levels from Assistant Secretary to Desk, most heavily on latter.
5. While substantial cross-section view has been obtained, coverage is not known to be a well-balanced sample.

## IS R USED?

### DIRECT WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH OIR 71% SAY "YES"




### OIR SERVICES USED - 74% USE ONE OR MORE



### PRODUCTS REGULARLY RECEIVED AND USED - 65% RECEIVE ONE OR MORE

TYPE OF PRODUCT	PERCENT RECEIVING - USING		HIGHEST		LOWEST	
Reports (IR and Serial)	<div><div></div></div>	65%	Area	Percent Using IR's	Area	Percent Using IR's
Estimates (NIE - SE - IE)	<div><div></div></div>	62%	EE	89%	ARA	61%
Current (IB - DIC)	<div><div></div></div>	55%	FE	85	E	60
Biographic (BI)	<div><div></div></div>	52%	NEA	85	EUR (Less EE)	52
			UNA	73	Fifth Floor	50
			QER	72	P	44
NIS	<div><div></div></div>	31%	IIA	69 (Half not sure)	TCA	43

### RESEARCH PROJECTS NOW IN PROCESS KNOWN ABOUT - 46% ONE OR MORE



Conclusion: R is well known and widely used either formally or informally.


## IS R USEFUL?

### OIR PRODUCTS

(Unaccounted for Percents Represent "No Comment" Cases)

BUREAU	TIMELINESS		QUALITY		READABILITY	
	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable
Fifth Floor		66	17	50		66
Geographic Bureaus	ARA	26 22	22	44	5	30
	EE	44 34	44	44	22	66
	EUR (Less EE)	40 4	20	12	12	16
	FE	27 38	19	61	12	50
	GHR	57	43	29		43
	NEA	33 38	16	71	8	41
Functional Bureaus	E	47 7	47	27	13	20
	IIA	39 8	8	62	8	46
	P	11 33		44		22
	TGA	28	None	None	14	
	UNA	73 9	45	27		18
Total	37%	25%	23%	45%	9%	33%

TIMELINESS - Principal complaint of OIR users.  
QUALITY - Predominance of favorable comment.  
READABILITY - Comment almost completely on favorable side, but much lower response obtained.  
With regard to specific products the lowest number of favorable responses was received on DIC's and IB's.




1. BI - The Biographic Division is both widely used and praised at all levels in Regional Bureaus. Unfavorable comments mainly in scattered areas where reporting is difficult.
2. IR - The Library has less opportunity to attract attention. Speed of circulation service is the most frequent complaint. The Accession List is appreciated.


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## IS R'S SETTING IN STATE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION ACCEPTABLE?


## ONLY ONE OUT OF FIVE ADVOCATE DECENTRALIZATION



## 47% DO NOT WORK WITH THE "INTELLIGENCE ADVISER"



## AND ONLY ONE IN THREE CONSIDER PRESENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH R ADEQUATE



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## OBSERVATIONS

### AN INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS A THOROUGHLY ESTABLISHED CONCEPT IN THE EYES OF THE BUREAUS

Some vestige of the original desire to disperse R among the Bureaus remains in the Geographic Bureaus, but this desire is strong primarily in EUR (less EE), and to a lesser extent in EE and ARA. Eight principal reasons are cited by the Bureaus in favor of the present integrated form:

- (1) More economical - regular staff in R too small to disperse.
- (2) Preserves objectivity and independence.
- (3) Secretary should have direct access to intelligence arm.
- (4) Avoids pressures of operations.
- (5) Functional Bureaus would be deprived of service.
- (6) Best means of meeting Department's IAC responsibilities.
- (7) Much of R's work must be self-initiated.
- (8) Use of R is a matter of personal relationships, not organization. Bureau might not provide proper supervision.

### FIVE OF EIGHT INTELLIGENCE ADVISERS OR LIAISON OFFICERS ARE CURRENTLY NOT VERY ACTIVE, AND THREE BUREAUS LACK SUCH SERVICE


<u>Bureau or Area</u>	<u>Activity of the IA</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Fifth Floor	Daily - Armstrong, Scammon	Almost complete satisfaction found
ARA	50% of time, substantive	Strong coordination of relations
EUR (including EE)	10% of time, non-substantive	Half of Bureau officers do not use
FE	90% of time, substantive	73% of Bureau officers use
GER	Five incumbents in 27 months	Considered additional duty
NEA	No present incumbent	Desks work direct
E	5-10%, non-substantive	53% work direct
IIA	Provided through CPT	Does not meet need in New York
P	On another assignment at present	Has provided liaison
TCA	No incumbent	Need not clearly developed
UNA	15% of time, substantive	91% work direct

### DISSATISFACTION WITH R RELATIONSHIPS EXISTS WHERE LIAISON IS WEAKEST

1. EUR - 60% of those outside of EE feel that better organized relationships are desirable. EE already enjoys such relationships with DRS.
2. GER - 57% express the same feeling as those in EUR.
3. E - 60% desire closer working relationships - a feeling which was expressed at all levels in Bureau.
4. IIA - 72% feel the need for better current relations - especially pronounced in IBS, IPS.

## CAN OIR BE OF GREATER SERVICE?

76% Express the View That OIR's Services Should Be More Useful or More Extensively Used by the Bureaus. In Summary, the Following:



## 142 COMMENTS WERE MADE REGARDING WAYS IN WHICH OIR SERVICES CAN BE MORE USEFUL

### 38% (54) ADVOCATE CLOSER WORKING RELATIONSHIPS

The most frequently mentioned need is a "cementing of relationships" to the end that OIR analysts gain "first-hand contact with and understanding of Desk operations," and that the Desks be placed in a position to "stimulate more studies." This step is given highest priority by ARA, EUR (less EE), GER, IIA, P and UNA. It is considered of minor importance by the Fifty Floor, EE, NEA and TCA.

### 27% (38) FEEL THAT OIR STAFFING SHOULD BE IMPROVED

OIR is considered "overworked and understaffed" by EE and NEA, and to a lesser extent by ARA, FE, E, EUR (the latter complains particularly of the inroads of NIS). Other Bureaus rate staffing second to improved relationships.

It is of interest that one or more officers in four Bureaus state that due to unavailability of OIR service it is necessary for them to perform some of their own research (ARA, EUR, FE, E).

### 15% (21) STRESS SPEEDIER OR MORE TIMELY SERVICE

Only EE, Fifth Floor and P find present service fast enough to meet their needs consistently, based upon comments received. In other Bureaus--particularly ARA, EUR, E and IIA--speed is considered a requisite of improved use. Several advocate spending less time in "finishing up" drafts.

### 20% (29) SUGGEST OTHER SERVICE FACTORS

A large variety of comments is represented here. IIA is particularly concerned with distribution and declassification problems. EUR, GER and E are concerned that a "more helpful attitude" be displayed. All are concerned that proper attention be given their requests and several suggest a formal advance planning and scheduling procedure.

## CONCLUSIONS OF CONSUMER ANALYSIS

1. R is well known and widely used, either formally or informally.
2. Timeliness is the principal complaint of OIR users. Quality and readability receive predominantly favorable comment. But Current Intelligence Products (DIC's and IB's) find the least favor.
3. BI products are widely used and praised at all levels in the Regional Bureaus. Unfavorable comments received from those areas where reporting is difficult.
4. The Library is not widely known and used since it has less opportunity to attract attention. Speed of circulation service is principal complaint heard.
5. An integrated Intelligence Research Organization is a thoroughly established concept in the eyes of the Bureaus.
6. Five of eight Intelligence Advisers and Liaison Officers are currently not very active, and three Bureaus lack such service (TCA, NEA, IIA).
7. Dissatisfaction with R relationships exists where liaison with the Bureaus is weakest: EUR (less EE), GER, E, IIA.
8. 76% of Bureau officials believe that OIR can be of greater service. The conditions of greater service are:
  - Closer working relationships
  - Improved staffing in research divisions
  - Speedier or more timely service
  - More helpful attitude
  - Better planning and scheduling; proper attention to requests.

The most critical problems are found in two Regional Bureaus-- EUR (less EE) and GER--and in the Functional Bureaus generally. Most satisfactory conditions prevail with S/P, NEA and FE, EE.

PART ONE

B—THE PRODUCER (ANALYST) ANALYSIS

METHOD OF STUDY

Four-hour interviews with selected analysts built around five questions:

- Who he is and how he was selected
- What he does
- How he works
- What obstacles he finds
- What his expectations are

COVERAGE AND VALIDITY

Approximately 5% of total analyst employment interviewed. Interviewees selected to provide full representation by program, discipline, grade, etc.

<u>Program</u>	<u>Discipline</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Other Factors</u>
Regular - 12	Political Science - 16	GS-13 - 5	Male - 19
NIS - 6	Economics - 5	GS-12 - 6	Female - 5
IIA - 3	Sociology - 1	GS-11 - 6	Ph.D. - 4
TCA - 1		GS-9 - 5	Masters - 10
BI - 2		GS-7 - 2	Bachelors - 10

The sampling is considered reasonably representative of analysts, their opinions and attitudes.

## THE ANALYST—WHO HE IS

R can be proud of the corps of professional talent it has assembled.  
Our study of the "sample" reveals that:

### HE IS WELL PREPARED FOR HIS TASKS

Education - 16% Doctor's Degree, 42% Master's Degree, 42% Bachelor's Degree.  
Language Ability - 25% read 3 or more - 46% read 2 or more.  
Outside Study - 50% are now engaged in outside study.  
Experience - 3½ years in R. 50% transferred from other Intelligence Activities.

### HE RESPECTS THE HIGH IMPORTANCE OF HIS TASKS

In response to the question: "What are the Qualifications of the Perfectly Qualified Analyst?"

- First - Education and experience in the area and discipline.
- Second - Ability to write quickly, clearly, concisely.
- Third - Objectivity, intellectual honesty, perspective.
- Fourth - Cooperative personality and ability to work with people.
- Fifth - Enthusiasm; drive; interest in job, area and subject.
- Sixth - Successful research experience; knowledge of techniques.


Even with this background, 54% feel that further training is desirable.

### HE HAS A GENUINE, LONG-TERM INTEREST IN HIS WORK

1. As evidenced by his feeling of job satisfaction:
  - None engaged in personal criticisms or petty complaints.
  - Willingness to work "as many hours as the job requires."
  - Favorable feeling about promotional opportunity - 75% think good.
2. As evidenced by his career interest:
  - 54% intend to stay in R. ) Two out of three evince
  - 12% intend to stay in intelligence work. ) a career interest.
  - 12% are interested in an operating responsibility in State Department.
  - 8% want to teach or write.
  - 14% have other interests.


# WHAT HE DOES—HOW HE WORKS Based upon a Study of 22 Analysts

HIS TASK IS DIVERSIFIED AND HIS WORKLOAD IS HEAVY



Only 39.5% of the time of the Regular Analyst is available for written products - about 16 hours per week. On an average each analyst has 3.5 projects in process requiring 138 hours to complete, thus the average "backlog" per analyst is nine calendar weeks of work. Question: can other time be reduced?


ALMOST HALF OF THE "PRODUCTION TIME" IS DEVOTED TO PREPARATION AND FINISHING STEPS  
HOURS DEVOTED EACH WEEK TO -



Thus only 8 hours per week are available for analysis and composition of written products. Question: can the analyst be relieved of any part of the remaining steps?

HE IS FREQUENTLY INTERRUPTED

CASE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANALYST (DRF)  
Average No. of starts per week for five analysts was 41.



Question: can number of interruptions be reduced?

50 48 min.

## THE ANALYST POSES FOUR GOALS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF HIS WORK

### FIRST--GREATER FREEDOM TO DO HIS JOB WELL

Greatest emphasis is placed upon the following steps:

#### A. FEWER INTERRUPTIONS

Ten analysts commented on various aspects of this problem:

- "Too much time required to read daily take."
  - "Interruptions hamper production. . .and priority changes."
  - "Reduce diffusion of time."
  - "Relieve of administrative work."
  - "Secure proper allocation of analyst's time to important tasks."
  - "Relieve of interference from current intelligence work requirement."
- Two out of three analysts state that current intelligence interferes with basic research.

#### B. MORE ASSISTANCE ON ROUTINE TASKS

Eighteen of the 24 analysts cited opportunities for release of their time for more productive duties. One estimated that 25%, and another that 40%, of his time could be conserved:

7 feel that portions of NIS work could be farmed out to uncleared personnel -- 3 would like a research assistant for data searching, reading and marking for files -- 4 would like assistance in reading, marking, clipping or abstracting the foreign press -- 4 want more clerical support "to keep files current", perform proofreading, prepare photographs -- With regard to services 29% say typing inadequate, 35% say reproduction inadequate, 40% say routing and follow-up of serials inadequate, 32% say LR services inadequate.










#### C. BETTER PLANNING AND SUPERVISION

Ten analysts cite organizational obstacles to better performance:

"R organization as a whole needs a clear picture of functions and responsibilities, now spread too thin -- Stop split allegiance to GPI and Branch Chief -- Supervisor should provide more guidance, especially when project is initiated (3 state no one reviews project prior to acceptance and 4 receive no help on outline) -- How too many echelons of supervision -- Use more team work, mutual help and exchange of ideas within R organization."

## THE ANALYST POSES FOUR GOALS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF HIS WORK

### SECOND—MORE KNOWLEDGE OF THE USERS AND USES OF R PRODUCTS

P R O D U C T S	WHAT PERCENT OF PRODUCTS MAKE THE FOLLOWING CONTRIBUTIONS		
	Important Direct	Subsidiary but Real	Some, Little or Do Not Know
R E G U L A R	 29%	 29%	 42%
N I S	 22%	 18%	 60%
B I O G R A P H I C	 73%	 22%	 5%

Lack of real knowledge of end use is the factor having most adverse effect on morale of Regular and NIS Analysts. This problem is perhaps aggravated by fact that many analysts lack regular formal contacts with the Bureaus. Only five attend Bureau meetings, and most contacts are said to be by telephone. Seven were strong in belief that R's work suffered from "Insulation." Two-thirds said they had no contact with Intelligence Adviser, and the remainder reported contacts very occasional, mainly in connection with clearance matters. 61% believe Bureaus get better data than R, or get data quicker.

### THIRD—MORE ADEQUATE TRAINING AND ORIENTATION

- 86% consider field trips important to proper performance.
- 54% recommend formal training, including top-level orientation, seminars on relationships problems, seminars on research methods, training in writing techniques.
- 16 of 21 analysts questioned admitted no use of the Analysts' Manual (one had not seen).
- The role of R/ES, ERS and PCS is neither understood nor appreciated:
  - None have contact with R/ES. One never heard of.
  - 9 of 21 reported no contact with ERS. None considered fruitful data or research source.
  - 7 of 15 reported no contact with PCS. Relationships termed insignificant.
- Most consider performance rating inadequate as a recognition of performance.

### FOURTH—BETTER FACILITIES

Half of the analysts feel that space conditions militate against proper performance. One out of four stated that less noise and more privacy would contribute to increased output. Of 21 expressing opinions on dictating equipment,

Six would definitely like such equipment.

Five others felt dictating machines might prove beneficial.

## CONCLUSIONS OF THE ANALYST ANALYSIS

### 1. R HAS AN ENVIABLE CORPS OF PROFESSIONAL TALENT

- Well prepared by education and experience
- Possessed of idealism regarding the importance of the tasks
- Possessed of genuine, long-term interest in the work of R.

### 2. THE WORKLOAD OF THE ANALYST IS DIVERSIFIED AND HEAVY

The average analyst studied has only eight hours per week available for the highest productive step of analysis and composition of written products. His backlog of project work is approximately nine weeks.

### 3. THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANALYST IS FURTHER REDUCED

by the numerous interruptions to which he is exposed. Five analysts studied for one week experienced an average of 41 interruptions during this period. (It is believed that this condition contributes heavily to the dislike of current intelligence work, which constitutes an additional source of interruptions.)

### 4. ANALYSTS PROPOSE SEVERAL STEPS

for the improvement of their productivity and effectiveness:

- A. Fewer interruptions
- B. More assistance on routine tasks
- C. More knowledge of the users and uses of R products
- D. Better work planning and supervision
- E. More adequate training and orientation
- F. Better facilities, providing less noise and more privacy

## PART ONE

### C—THE ADMINISTRATOR ANALYSIS

#### FIVE QUESTIONS EXAMINED

1. What Is the State Department Role in the Intelligence Community?
2. How Do R's Executives Spend Their Time?
3. What Types Of Controls Are Applied?
4. Is the Organization So Constructed as to Secure Effective Use of Executive Time and Skills?

#### METHOD AND COVERAGE OF STUDY

1. Study of NSC Directives, and interviews with 17 officials of IAC agencies, plus 4 officials of Bureau of Budget.
2. Interviews with all R administrators\* from the Special Assistant to branch chief level.
3. Daily diaries for five consecutive days from 68 R administrators.
4. Discussions with key administrative personnel of the Department, including Deputy Assistant Secretary, A/MS, DB, DP, CS.

\* Excluding SPS and two Intelligence Staff Officers whose work was not covered by the survey.

## STATE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

In order to avoid restrictions on the use of this report which would result from a higher classification of its contents, direct quotations from NSC Directives have been deleted. It should be noted, however, that the directives as a body, and related delegations, among other things

- A. Define State Department's fields of dominant interest: Political, Cultural, Sociological. (Intelligence in Economic, Scientific, Technological fields to be developed "as needed.")
- B. Transfer to State Department (January 1951) functions formerly performed by the CIA in the fields of Political, Sociological and Cultural research, including responsibility for intelligence in support of Psychological Programs.
- C. Describe the responsibilities of the Department's intelligence arm as
  - 1. The provision of Basic, Current and Staff intelligence needed by the Department to execute its mission and discharge its lawful responsibilities.
  - 2. The contribution of reports, estimates, briefs or summaries as requested by proper authority in connection with the Government's program of National Intelligence.
- D. Charge the Director of Central Intelligence with the conduct of surveys and inspections of Departmental intelligence materials.

A study of these directives, supplemented by conversations with several key executives in the Intelligence Community, leaves partly unanswered a number of basic questions.

## QUESTIONS SUGGESTED BY NSC DIRECTIVES

### STATE'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE FIELDS OF ITS DOMINANT INTEREST

One directive provides that steps be taken to minimize independent intelligence production by any agency in the fields of dominant interest assigned to another. It further provides that agencies exchange information and plans. In the case of one field of intelligence, the agency of dominant interest is given explicit responsibilities to

- Review requirements, facilities and arrangements.
- Insure that full knowledge and talent is applied.
- Evaluate pertinence, extent, quality of data and develop ways of improving.
- Conduct common service research to supplement production of other agencies and fill requests of IAC.

Question: Does State Department have any of the above responsibilities in its fields of dominant interest? If so, should it take more active steps to exercise coordination and provide leadership, especially in view of the 1951 transfer of responsibilities from CIA?

### THE EXTENT TO WHICH STATE DEPARTMENT RECEIVES OR SHOULD SEEK LEADERSHIP AND GUIDANCE FROM THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Director of Central Intelligence is charged by one directive with responsibility for developing comprehensive objectives to guide the collection and production of National Intelligence. He is also charged with the conduct of such surveys and inspections of Departmental intelligence materials as he deems necessary to advise the NSC and make recommendations for the coordination of intelligence activities.

Question: Is such leadership and guidance provided in sufficient degree? Should the Department seek more guidance with particular emphasis upon assessing the adequacy of production in relation to Departmental and National needs? Is the current balance between Basic Intelligence production on the one hand and Current Staff Intelligence on the other hand, optimum?


### THE EXTENT TO WHICH R RECEIVES OR SHOULD SEEK GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FROM WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT ITSELF

One directive specifies that Departmental Intelligence is that needed by a Department, and the subordinate units thereof, to execute its mission and discharge its lawful responsibilities. Current Intelligence is defined as that of immediate interest and value to operating and policy staffs. Staff Intelligence is to be produced as each department shall require.

Question: Is R alone responsible for determining what is "of interest and value" to operating and policy officers? If not, should more satisfactory means of securing such guidance be sought? Should steps be taken to secure more active consideration by top policy levels of the adequacy of R's staffing and facilities in relation to departmental needs for current and staff intelligence?

CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information

# HOW DO R EXECUTIVES SPEND THEIR TIME?



## DISTRIBUTION OF TIME OF DIVISION CHIEFS

Division	Percent of Time Devoted to Following			
	Working with Subordinates	Budget and Personnel	Conferences and Meetings	Reading, Review and Writing
DRA	42%	12%	34%	12%
DRF (Yager)	20	7	55	18
DRS	40	8	20	32
DRW	8	19	46	27
DFI	23	21	27	29
IAD	20	14	46	20
BI	26	13	37	24
LR	28	10	32	30
(Data on DRN not available)				

## OBSERVATIONS

The data reported are based upon one cycle of five days, occurring in most cases during the last half of February, 1952. While not necessarily representative, the following may be significant:

**FIRST—TWO-THIRDS OF THE TIME OF R EXECUTIVES IS DEVOTED TO DUTIES OTHER THAN THE IMMEDIATE SUPERVISION OF SUBORDINATES**

The majority of the time reported was spent in meetings, conferences, reading, reviewing and writing. On an average, R executives spent this five-day period as follows:

- 1-2/3 days in conferences and meetings.  
(A total of 484 conferences other than regular meetings were held by 35 executives.)
- 1-2/3 days reading, reviewing, writing.
- 1-2/3 days on administrative matters (one day working directly with subordinates).

**SECOND—THE TOP TWO EXECUTIVES OF R APPEAR TO HAVE LIMITED TIME IN WHICH TO WORK WITH OFFICE EXECUTIVES AND R/ES, EXCLUSIVE OF TWO REGULAR STAFF MEETINGS**

The Special Assistant's diary revealed a total of 22 contacts with R Executives, but 17 of these were with staff personnel in his immediate office. At the Office Level there was one conference with the Director of OIR, and two meetings with the Director of R/ES.

The Deputy Special Assistant's diary revealed 37 individual contacts with R executives. All but eight were with personnel in the Front Office. Of the eight, two were with R/ES, three with OLI and four with OIR.

**THIRD—OIR DIVISION CHIEFS VARY WIDELY IN THE TIME AVAILABLE FOR OR DEVOTED TO DIRECT SUPERVISION OF SUBORDINATES**

Division	No. of Contacts by Chief and Deputy	Minutes Spent	No. of GS-7 and Above	Contacts Per Person	Minutes Per Person
DRA	42	1,740	22	1.9	79.0
DRS	49	1,420	53	0.9	26.8
DRF	48	1,020	60	0.8	17.0
DFI	18	535	34	0.5	15.7
DRW	22	540	65	0.3	8.3

The percentage spread in time devoted per person was 850% between the highest and lowest divisions.

**FOURTH—OIR BRANCH CHIEFS SPEND HALF OF THEIR TOTAL TIME IN READING, REVIEWING, AND WRITING, REFLECTING THE SUBSTANTIVE DEMANDS UPON FIRST-LINE SUPERVISION**

It is striking to note that the time devoted to the product itself increases markedly at the point of immediate supervision:

	<u>% of Time to Written Product</u>
Director of OIR	31%
OIR Division Chiefs	25%
OIR Deputy Division Chiefs	34%
OIR Branch Chiefs	50%


While this expenditure of time is directly related to "Quality Control," it calls attention to the importance of adequate "administrative" assistance at the division level.

## FOUR TEST QUESTIONS CONCERNING CONTROLS


TEST QUESTIONS	OBSERVATIONS	
	STRENGTHS	POSSIBLE WEAKNESSES
HOW IS THE RESEARCH PROGRAM PLANNED?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Estimates and major studies - The Program Guide for 1962 sets a general pattern "to guide OIR in its approach to major intelligence problems such as generally treated in IE's, NIE's and major intelligence reports of interest to the EO." Reinforcing this Guide will be a semi-annual program review with each division chief.</li> <li>2. Support Programs - The NIS Program has been carefully outlined by the CIA "Standard Instructions" and the actions of the NIS Committee. IIA support is coordinated by a staff under the CPI. Study is now being given to TCA support by OIR.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Since IE's and NIE's represent but a segment of Regular Program hours, a substantial part of the research program lacks central or coordinated guidance.</li> <li>2. Consumer Reaction studies indicate that principal sources of major program guidance are IAC, R's channel to the Top Level including S/P. The views of the Assistant Secretary Level represent a rather untapped source since Intelligence Advisers do not function effectively in this respect, with exceptions. Intra-Bureau guidance is spotty for same reason. CIA is most active of IAC Agencies.</li> <li>3. Division and branch chiefs do a minimum of recorded planning. This limits planning for acquisition.</li> </ol>
HOW IS PRODUCT QUALITY CONTROLLED?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Regular Program - Division and branch chiefs devote substantial effort to the reviewing of products prior to completion, and appear to achieve a superior degree of control. The EO provides similar excellent control of estimates and papers of interest to the EO.</li> <li>2. Support Programs - NIS sections are subjected to approximately six reviews, including the branch, division, OIR coordinator and the CIA. A high degree of perfection is sought. The CPI performs limited quality coordination.</li> <li>3. Current Intelligence is controlled by PCS.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. It is felt by some OIR customers and some analysts that division-branch review is overdone in relation to need.</li> <li>2. Customer reaction with respect to quality and utility is not systematically canvassed. This again is believed to reflect a weakness in the Intelligence Adviser program. The evaluation procedure in EUR appears mechanical and results are of questionable utility.</li> </ol>
HOW IS THE TIMING AND SPEED OF WORK CONTROLLED?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Regular Program - EO papers are thoroughly scheduled and successfully policed. Divisions tend to give top priority to these projects. Serial products are given continuing attention. Current Intelligence is actively (though less intensively) coordinated by PCS. Scheduled briefings are faithfully met. BI products are uniformly on time.</li> <li>2. Support Programs - NIS is the most elaborately scheduled of R projects, and progress is thoroughly documented by section and stage. CPI maintains progress review of IIA projects.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Regular Program Projects other than estimates, serials and Current Intelligence are not subjected to consistent or realistic scheduling. The Work Jacket is given only token attention, and PCS lacks the basis of operating an effective control. Division and branch chiefs are beset by so many problems that "non-substantive control" is neglected. Those who try are undoubtedly discouraged by the inexact nature of such controls. The Intelligence Advisers lend little assistance here.</li> <li>2. NIS suffers from above problems, plus staffing.</li> </ol>
HOW IS MANAGEMENT INFORMED OF GAPS AND FAILURES?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Regular Program - As cited above, adequate control techniques appear to exist with respect to major projects. Other program items are reported in bi-weekly and monthly reports. R/ES compiles a detailed summary monthly for management in the Program Reporting Book.</li> <li>2. Support Programs - A system of meetings and reports keeps a sharp focus on the status of NIS.</li> <li>3. Matters of general interest are additionally reported to management through the system of staff meetings held at Division, Office and R levels.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Due to the absence of complete planning and control, the basis for accurate analysis of performance by management is lacking. OIR division project status reports vary widely in frequency and content (bi-weekly to quarterly).</li> <li>2. Most meetings and reports appear informational rather than action-getting in character. It is noted that recent R/ES study questions the Bi-Weekly Report of Special Activities and the Monthly Report to R. The Divisional Staff Meeting appears in need of stronger development.</li> <li>3. The Program Reporting Book (a \$20,000 production) is now being recast to improve usefulness.</li> </ol>

## EVIDENCES OF THE NEED FOR STRONGER AND MORE ACCURATE CONTROLS OVER THE TIMING AND SPEED OF PRODUCTION

### ANALYSIS OF WORK IN PROCESS (REGULAR PROGRAM)



### PRODUCTION RECORD UNDER NIS PROGRAM (MONTHLY OUTPUT OF SECTIONS)



### DIFFERENCES IN DEPLOYMENT OF ANALYST CAPACITY

FUNCTION	PERCENT OF MAN HOURS ALLOCATED IN FOUR SELECTED BRANCHES*			
	Northeast Asia	African	North and West Europe	DRS Foreign Political
NIE's and IE's	13	4	17	9
Intelligence Reports	19	30	27	11
Serial Reports	2	1	3	16
Special Papers	2	1	7	2
Briefings	4	2	2	2
Current Intelligence	9	8	10	8
Spot Inquiry	7	7	4	8
Reading, Other Intake	37	37	21	39
Administration	7	10	9	5

\* The above study is based upon a six-month projection of "Regular Program" effort developed in collaboration with the Branch Chiefs concerned.

## IS THE ORGANIZATION PROPERLY CONSTRUCTED?

The R Area is fortunate in having a young and vigorous top management team, wholeheartedly devoted to its tasks. This great strength compensates for the many natural difficulties encountered in administering functions of such complexity. Three principal matters warrant attention:

### FIRST--THE TOP MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE IS LOOSELY KNIT

- A. Due to the extreme demands upon their time, the top executives lack the opportunity to exercise close direction over the Office Directors.
- B. The Director of R/ES is, as a result, attempting to fill part of this administrative gap but from the position of a staff - not a line - officer.
- C. The Director of OIR is seriously overburdened, and must choose the strongest vehicle of program management available to him - the EG.
- D. The Director of OLI has a more manageable task, and more time in which to direct the functions assigned to him.

### SECOND--MOST TOP MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS CAN MAKE A BROADER OR MORE EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION

The following warrant particular consideration:

- |                                    |                         |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| (1) The Special Assistant's Office | (6) The NIS Coordinator |
| (2) The Director, R/ES and Staff   | (7) The CPI             |
| (3) The Director, OIR              | (8) The ERS             |
| (4) The Director, OLI              | (9) The PCS             |
| (5) The EG                         |                         |

In addition the role of each division can be strengthened in one or more respects.

### THIRD--STRONGER ORGANIZATION WILL IMPROVE THE UTILIZATION OF EXECUTIVE SKILLS


Our observations have been sufficiently close to permit evaluation of the utilization of 40 principal executives. All are rated "average" or above in professional qualifications and performance--an unusual record. However, 13 do not appear effectively utilized, due to one of following reasons:

- Better suited to broader substantive participation: 4
- Qualified for more responsible management role: 9

This finding will guide our suggestions regarding future organizational refinements.

## A SYMBOLIC DIAGRAM TO VISUALIZE PROBLEM ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATION

(Based upon Interviews and Observations)



# PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS ON PRESENT ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

Top Management functions whose contribution to R's program can be broadened or made more effective.

Figures at top of each box are total number of positions of all types.

## (R) SPECIAL ASSISTANT - INTELLIGENCE

As a principal "product" of the organization, the Special Assistant's time is heavily invested in external relations both in the Department and the JAG. Due to the importance of providing this participation, the Deputy Special Assistant must be prepared to serve as an alter ego.

## (R/ES) DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE STAFF

The staff performs admirably in the executive fields of budget, personnel and general office services. Its ability to contribute more broadly to program and production management is limited by staff status to top executives who are able to devote minimum time to internal management. Analyst staff is relatively junior.

## (OIR) DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

1. Supervisory burden appears too complex, comprising full responsibility for the substantive program, as well as administration of two-thirds of R's force. Fourteen components directly responsible to the Director, most of a promising character.
2. Lacks immediate administrative officer support.

## (OLI) DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF LIBRARIES AND INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION

- Two principal questions are posed: (1) OLI as a group of functions is not coordinate in stature with OIR, being more in the nature of a supporting service. It actually more akin to OIR than OLI.
- (2) The executive demands residing here may not fully utilize the substantive skills of executives assigned.

95	1 NIS	16 CFI	6 ES	6*	10	2	1 GE	4
ESTIMATES GROUP	NIS COORDINATOR	COORDINATOR PSYCH. INTEL.	EXTERNAL RESEARCH STAFF	PRODUCTION CONTROL STAFF	SPECIAL ASSISTANT SOCIOLOGICAL AFFS.	SPECIAL ASSIST. CENTRAL ASIA COMMITTEE	GEOGRAPHER	
Basic question: Can the ES assume still broader program planning and quality control responsibility?	Responsible for 34% of R's program, but lacks authority to enforce compliance with R's schedules.	R's planning and staffing to meet responsibility in this field not fully developed.	Potentiality as a producer of research to meet program needs not fully developed.	Collection of miscellaneous functions. Control not actually exercised. Possible conflict with CIA on current intelligence.	Position appears of doubtful importance as staff assistant to the Director.	Position appears of doubtful importance as staff assistant to the Director.	Appears to be an extraneous function to OIR program. Receives little guidance.	

## RESEARCH DIVISIONS

34	87	75	81	96	44	81	67	65	102
AMERICAN REPUBLICS	FAR EAST	NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND AFRICA	EUROPE AND EASTERN EUROPE	WESTERN EUROPE	FUNCTIONAL INTELLIGENCE	BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION	ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION	LIBRARY AND REFERENCE SERVICES	
Immediate problem is lack of Branch Chief support resulting in overload on Division Chief and bottlenecking of review. No Division Editor.	1. Division Chief part time. 2. Division Economist serves in part as reviewing officer. Editor only GS-7. 3. No research Reference Unit. 4. FEA relationships poor.	No Asst. Chief provided, but Division has outstanding performance record on NEA and Bureau relations.	Current reorganization is correcting overload on Division Chief.	1. GE-NEA relations poor. 2. Division Chief has minimum time available for administration. 3. Asst. Chief administers WE Branch.	1. Major opportunities for new or expanded services, including EAC, TCA and perhaps UNA. 2. No Assistant Chief or Editor.	Primarily a research production function. Benefits might accrue from closer integration with OIR program, as well as more incentive to analysts.	1. Document routing function also performed in part in IR, RCI. 2. Some duplication with LR exists on publications procurement and funds control. 3. Requirements planning function now limited by absence of OIR planning. 4. Division Chief overloaded.	Excellent steps now in process to resolve overlaps with OIR. Reference Officers not effective except in NEA and EW. Broader service to Bureau may be possible.	

## CONCLUSIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR ANALYSIS

### WITH REGARD TO THE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Study of NSC Directives and brief conversations with IAC executives suggest three questions:

1. Does the Department have an obligation or an opportunity to exercise more leadership and direction in the Community with respect to its fields of dominant interest?
2. Should the Department seek more guidance from the CIA, particularly with regard to assessing the adequacy of its production?
3. If Departmental Intelligence is material of interest and value to operating and policy officers, does R not have an obligation to seek more aggressively the views and interests of Departmental customers?

### WITH REGARD TO THE USE OF R EXECUTIVES' TIME

1. Two-thirds of their time is devoted to duties other than the immediate supervision of subordinates.
2. The two top executives appear to have limited time in which to work with the Office Directors and R/ES, exclusive of two weekly staff meetings.
3. OIR division chiefs vary widely in time available for, or devoted to, the direct supervision of subordinates.
4. OIR branch chiefs spend half of their total time in reading, reviewing and writing, reflecting the heavy substantive demands upon first line supervision.

### WITH REGARD TO CONTROLS

1. Program planning of a formal nature is now performed for but a portion of the regular program of research.
2. Quality control is given continuing, substantial attention, but consumer reaction is not systematically tapped.
3. Production control is the most neglected aspect of R's management, as revealed by the lack of attention to accurate scheduling and vigorous expediting.
4. Management lacks fully useful current control reports and performance reviews which can serve as the basis for corrective action.

### WITH REGARD TO THE ORGANIZATION

1. The top-management structure is loosely knit.
2. Most top management functions can, it is believed, make a broader or more effective contribution.
3. Stronger organization will improve the utilization of 1 out of 3 top executives.

**PART TWO**

**PROGRAMS OF IMPROVEMENT**

**A—TO IMPROVE CONSUMER RELATIONS**

- **THE ORGANIZATIONAL VEHICLES**
- **USER EDUCATION AT THE DESK LEVEL**
- **DISTRIBUTION POLICIES**
- **CLASSIFICATION CONTROL**
- **CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS**
- **STYLE AND FORMAT OF WRITTEN PRODUCTS**

## THE ORGANIZATIONAL VEHICLES

### THE PROBLEM

1. The Intelligence Adviser has not provided an effective channel or representative for the R Area. This vehicle is believed unsatisfactory for three reasons:
  - A. He owes no allegiance to the R Area and is not responsive to R's problems.
  - B. With exceptions he does not appear to enjoy top status or prestige in his own bureau, being considered a marginal contributor.
  - C. He has tended to acquire major operating responsibilities, thus reducing his availability for the intelligence adviser role.
2. R's channels to Departmental customers have tended to be concentrated at the top and at the bottom. Thus a void exists at the Assistant Secretary level and in many instances at the Office Director level. OIR Division Chiefs have lacked contacts enjoyed by branch chiefs and in some cases by the analysts (DRS notable exception).
3. Organized means of gauging consumer reaction have not been developed.
4. Of unknown importance to us is the adequacy of organized relationships with top officials in IAC Agencies, other than through the ONE, IAC and Watch Committee.

### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

1. Discontinue reliance upon the Intelligence Adviser as a primary vehicle of relationships.
2. Establish by direction of the Secretary an "Intelligence Consultant" to the Assistant Secretary of each Bureau to be furnished by the R Area from its permanent staff of executives. This function should be assumed as an additional duty by OIR division chiefs or other key officials (such as the CPI). The Intelligence Consultant will be a regular participant in top bureau councils and will receive from time to time the views of top bureau officials respecting matters which should be studied by the R Area.
3. Establish the policy that OIR branch chiefs will maintain direct working relationships with their opposite number in the Department for the same purposes.
4. Encourage regular programs of briefings of bureau officials by Intelligence Consultants and branch chiefs.
5. Establish in R a "Consumer Relations Coordinator" whose functions will include an imaginative program of assessing the adequacy of use of R's services and inaugurating steps to improve their use. This should be based in part on periodic personal interviews with users.
6. Renew efforts to secure more interest in and systematic guidance to R's major program of estimates and research on the part of top policy officials.
7. Take steps to secure similar improvement in interdepartmental relationships, including consideration to the establishment of an "Interdepartmental Intelligence Council" in R's fields of dominant interest.

## USER EDUCATION AT THE DESK LEVEL

### THE PROBLEM

1. Desk personnel in the Bureaus appear to have considerable independence with regard to their work habits and differ to extremes in their utilization of the intelligence resource.
2. Added to this difficult audience factor is the continuing turnover of desk personnel. Some were encountered with Bureau service ranging from a few weeks to several months (in one case two years) who do not fully understand R's role and services.
3. R is producing written research products at the rate of 1200 per year (excluding BI), and the number of documents having both general and specific interest to individual Desks is ever mounting. The present monthly and semi-annual catalogs provide a means of informing this audience of recent products, but they do not provide a complete bibliographic approach to R's products and holdings. This was found to be a matter of concern to some of the Desk Officers who desire to make fuller use of R Area services.

### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

1. Inaugurate a program of individualized indoctrination of new or uninformed Desk Officers and other Bureau officials. This program should be under the guidance of the proposed Consumer Relations Coordinator and consist of two principal components: (1) a dignified but highly concrete and vivid story of the intelligence operations of the Department, designed for visual-oral presentation; (2) a plan of indoctrination for new Bureau officials shortly after assignment, to be conducted by the branch chief and the analyst who will be the immediate point of contact.
2. Expand the bibliographic assistance of R to Bureau officials. It is felt that IR has an opportunity to improve R's services to the Department in two important respects:
  - A. By devising a loose-leaf bibliography of R products and most significant IR holdings on each area, and furnishing this service to individual Desks. This service should be classified both by area and by subject, and should be kept up to date by monthly accession lists and periodic revisions. (Descriptive accession lists might achieve wider review.)
  - B. By inaugurating a program of individual study of the reference needs of each Office in the Regional Bureaus with the objective of determining the reference materials and files required and of establishing a permanent basis of maintaining these tools. This study should likewise identify the needs of the Desks for spot fact servicing, and develop techniques of expanding IR's participation in servicing these needs.

## DISTRIBUTION POLICIES

### THE PROBLEM

While wide distribution of written products is an admirable indication of R's desire to serve and inform, there are several important dangers in policy leading to unnecessarily wide distribution:

1. The analyst may feel compelled to go beyond the needs of the target user in completing his research, analysis and composition.
2. The additional time and cost of "finishing up" the product (editing, review, reproduction) may not be justified. Several of R's best customers pointed out that the value of the research is sometimes realized by the time a paper has reached the first draft stage.
3. Personalized service may be lost and undesirable friction engendered by insisting upon outside distribution in borderline cases.
4. Perhaps most important is the irritation which may result to the reader with only marginal interest, and the impression that R is investing hundreds of man hours in products of low value. Less friendly consumers now hold this view, and most emphasize the fact that requested products are of greatest value.

### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

With respect to research products which have as their objective specific and timely use (in contrast to basic research projects or those designed for general audience appeal):

1. Adopt a policy of distribution to the target user(s) at the earliest possible date, emphasizing personalized service, and regulating broader distribution on the basis of "interest and value" or the necessity of securing attention.
  - A. Encourage the production of a carbon of the stencil for hand delivery to the requestor or most important target user.
  - B. Extend the practice of abstract IB's (now used in 10% of the cases), and withhold general distribution in more cases until specific demand has developed. Danger of duplication under present procedures.
  - C. Take a more liberal view toward the production of "requestor only IR's" in those situations where this is the most effective basis of securing attention and use (only 1% now). Consider giving special papers official status.
2. Delegate control of above policy to the Consumer Relations Coordinator, and assign this officer responsibility for working with Bureau distribution centers to secure the most accurate basis of distribution and timely clearance.
3. Conduct a periodic audit of mailing lists for serial products, by verifying the desire of addressee to continue receiving the publication (subscription renewal principle).

## CLASSIFICATION CONTROL

### THE PROBLEM

1. There is reported to be a tendency to overclassify products in the interest of conservatism and perhaps because of the feeling that the higher the classification the greater the "prestige" of the paper. 70% of products are now classified as "confidential" or higher, 37% falling in secret categories.
2. The growing importance of the Information Program places pressure on the need for minimum degree of classification. One R executive estimated that the use of R's products could be increased threefold in the Information Area if this policy were followed. Several Desk Officers felt usage of R's products was overly restricted by the degree of classification.
3. The Committee on Declassification has not met since July 1951 and the procedures involved appear cumbersome, especially the draft declassification form.
4. Thus the major responsibility now resides with the analyst and the branch chief, and consistent standards are difficult to assure.

### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

1. Establish on the staff of the Consumer Relations Coordinator the position of "Classification Control Officer" to supplant the Declassification Committee and perform the following duties:
  - A. Establish and publish specific classification regulations as they apply to R's work.
  - B. Review the security classification assigned to each report, at least on a post audit basis, to assure proper classification and particularly to revise the classification of overclassified documents.
  - C. Counsel analysts upon request regarding proper classification.
  - D. Conduct review of reports on their third or sixth month anniversary date to determine the need for classification revision and the possibility of reduction.
  - E. Act as liaison with other agencies in classification and declassification matters.
2. As part of the above procedure, adopt the practice of having the analyst record on the Work Jacket the justification for the classification assigned and the conditions under which a revision in classification may be justified. The analyst might also be asked to suggest an appropriate date for review of the classification assigned.

## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

### THE PROBLEM

This subject has a number of aspects:

1. Generally lower regard for these products is found among target users. (It may be significant that 75% of copies of IB's are returned versus 40% of IR's.)
2. Lack of agreement within R as to the objective and the target audience: Useful exercise for the analyst; the Bureau Desk; the peripheral reader; the outside agency.
3. General analyst resistance to this task - 61% of the test group felt that current intelligence interferes with more important work and causes more painstaking reading of the "daily take" than otherwise required.
4. Absence of aggressive central leadership in the identification and production of Current Intelligence products. Possibility of overlap with CPI.
5. Competition with publications of others: S/S-R, CIA, Bureau summaries, other agencies.

### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

1. Appoint a full-time "Current Intelligence Coordinator" to the staff of the EG to provide strong leadership to this program, including authority to instruct divisions as to subjects on which current intelligence is to be developed, including deadlines therefor.
2. Discontinue the Current Intelligence Committee and the single Current Intelligence Officer in each division. As an objective, require each branch to designate one analyst with responsibility for staying abreast of Current Intelligence developments and responding to the instructions of the EG. (This function should likewise be related to improved control of document flow discussed on page 60.)
3. Confine IB's to truly significant items and direct their distribution to the specific audience which will find them of "interest and value." Where outside distribution is considered important, impose specific deadline on bureau clearance, or distribute without prior clearance (but make a post audit of Bureau views).
4. Reevaluate the purpose of the DIC series, and explore the feasibility of collaborating with CIA in the publication of a Daily Summary suitable for List II distribution.
5. Effectuate daily working relationships between the Current Intelligence Coordinator and the CIA/OCI in the identification of key topics.

## STYLE AND FORMAT

### THE PROBLEM

1. A typical OIR report will be read or scanned by 100 or more readers. It is estimated that over 40 man hours are devoted simply to reading time. Thus R has an important obligation to conserve the time of its audience by producing products whose language, style and format contribute to fast reading.
2. Inspection of a large sampling of R's reports reveals that this objective is not uniformly pursued:
  - Long sentences are used - an average of 30.8 words as compared with 22.6 words on an average for three highly technical magazines.
  - Long words are used - an average of 184.8 syllables per 100 words as compared with 169 in the three technical magazines.
  - Long paragraphs are used. One of 18 sentences containing 431 words observed; another of 9 sentences containing 427 words.
  - Unfamiliar words are used - a list of 20 words was selected from R reports and submitted to two customers. Several were not readily understood.
  - Topic outline form and underscored captions are sparingly used.
  - A "reading ease" test applied to eight products selected at random revealed scores in the highest field of difficult reading.
  - Wide variations noted in inclusion of contents statement, introduction, conclusions statement, abstract, etc.

### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

1. Develop a manual on the art of writing readable intelligence products, drawing on R's own reports for case examples and illustrating principles appearing on following exhibit (20% improvement in reading time estimated by two heavy users of R products).
2. Appoint a well-qualified editor in each division, thoroughly trained to apply these principles of readable writing. Conduct systematic on-the-job training of analysts to the fullest practicable extent.
3. As a companion step, develop a style manual and conduct systematic training of all report typists in its application. This manual should establish uniform specifications for all mechanical details over which typists have primary control (margins, capitalization, numbering, footnotes, tabulations, spelling, abbreviations, punctuation, etc.).
4. Improve the appearance and attention-getting value of R's reports by continuing attention to physical appearance (illustrations cited in Volume II).
5. Delegate responsibility for planning and coordinating the above program (and future report presentation techniques) to the Consumer Relations Coordinator.

## ILLUSTRATION OF REVISIONS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO READING EASE

(Based upon IR 5769 "Prospects of Japanese Trade with the Republic of Korea")

### ORIGINAL FORM

**PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

This report was based on available materials covering the period January 1958 to present, analysis of which was completed on March 1, 1958 by Division of Research For Far East.

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**PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

### I. EXPANDED OUTLINE FORM

### REVISED FORM

**PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

This report was based on available materials covering the period January 1958 to present, analysis of which was completed on March 1, 1958 by Division of Research For Far East.

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**PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

Twelve outline headings used instead of seven. Each becomes an underscored caption in the body of the report, presenting better display and additional "finding aids".

## II. THE "HEADLINE STYLE" ABSTRACT

### ORIGINAL FORM

**PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

**ABSTRACT**

Former trade between Japan and the Republic of Korea has been at abnormally low levels, amounting roughly to \$15 million each way. Prospects for an expansion of this trade in the immediate future are dependent on whether Korea obtains 50 or other international financial institutions to meet the requirements for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. Should such assistance become available, Japan would play a significant role in supplying capital equipment, manufactured consumer goods, and chemical fertilizers needed by Korea.

Export from an extensive program financed by outside sources between Japan and Korea will be governed largely by Korea's ability to expand production of raw materials. Exports to Japan of steel and aluminum, marine products, and other commodities can be expanded but are of much smaller importance than potential raw materials, which would find a ready market in Japan. Trade between the two countries might also be expanded through the extension of long-term Japanese credits, both governmental and private, should Korea in the future overcome existing political and psychological barriers against dealing with Japan. At present, however, Japan does not have strong economic incentives to conduct on a large scale trade program with Korea.

**PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

### REVISED FORM

**PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

**ABSTRACT**

Trade between Japan and Korea, amounting roughly to \$15 million each way.

Expansion prospects depend upon 50 or other international financial institutions to meet the requirements for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. Japan would play an important role in supplying capital equipment, manufactured consumer goods, steel, and chemical fertilizers needed by Korea.

Korea's ability to expand production of raw materials is the key factor, according to outside help. Steel, aluminum, marine products, etc., exports can be expanded but are much less important.

Japan's potential and governmental credits play a significant role with Korea. Extending these credits might expand trade through the extension of governmental and private long-term Japanese credits.

However, Japan does not have strong economic incentives for a large trade - credit program to Korea.

**PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

Five short paragraphs used instead of two long paragraphs. Lead sentences underscored enable the eye to catch key points at a glance.

### III. MORE PLEASING DISPLAY IN BODY OF TEXT

ORIGINAL FORM

REVISED FORM

REPRODUCED  
SECURITY INFORMATION

PROGRESS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

I. PATTERN OF TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA

From 1910 until 1945, more than 90 percent of Korea's total trade was with Japan proper. In the immediate pre-World War II period almost all Korean trade was within the Japanese Empire (including Manchuria). Total trade with Japan in 1936 and 1938 amounted to 370 and 427 million dollars respectively.

Basically speaking, the present pattern of trade consisted of an exchange of Korean rice, marine products, silkworms, and textile raw materials for Japanese textile manufactures, machinery, metal products, vehicles, processed foodstuffs and beverages, fertilizers, and sundry goods. Because of Japan's desire to industrialize Korea for the purpose of strengthening Japan's economic base, trade in the 1930's showed a consistent excess of Korean imports over exports to Japan. Machinery, metal manufactures, and vehicle imports from Japan showed a specially significant increase each year beginning in the mid 1930's.

As a result of World War II, Korea's economy, although not subjected to extensive physical damage, was disrupted by political and economic separation from Japan and by the division of the country into northern and southern political zones. With the partition of Korea and the tightening of the free curtailment at the 38th parallel, the southern zone became heavily dependent on economic aid from abroad.

The Republic of Korea (ROK), which was established in 1948 in the area south of the 38th parallel, is predominantly dependent on agriculture and fishing, and has only minor light and almost no heavy industries. Its economic aid brought about a degree of recovery through reconstruction of industry and agriculture, but with the beginning of hostilities in June 1950, much of this progress was negated.

REPRODUCED  
SECURITY INFORMATION

REPRODUCED  
SECURITY INFORMATION

PROGRESS OF JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

I. PATTERN OF TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA

A. Trade in World War II

1. More than 90 percent of Korea's trade was with Japan proper from 1910 until 1945. Total trade with Japan in 1936 was 370 and in 1938 was 427 million dollars. The present pattern of trade was -

KOREA	JAPANESE
Rice	Textile manufactures
Marine products	Machinery
Silkworms	Metal products
Textile raw materials	Vehicles
	Processed foodstuffs and beverages
	Fertilizers
	Sundry goods

2. Korean imports in the 1930's consistently exceeded exports to Japan. This was due to Japan's desire to industrialize Korea for the purpose of strengthening Japan's economic base. Machinery, metal products, and vehicle imports from Japan increased significantly beginning in the mid-1930's.

B. After World War II

1. Korea's economy, although not subjected to extensive physical damage in World War II, was disrupted by -

- Political and economic separation from Japan and
- The partition of Korea at the 38th parallel.

2. With the tightening of the free curtailment, the southern zone became heavily dependent upon economic aid from abroad.

3. The Republic of Korea (ROK) depends predominantly upon agriculture and fishing. It has only minor light and almost no heavy industries.

REPRODUCED  
SECURITY INFORMATION

1. More main paragraphs - 35 instead of 24 in full report.
2. Use of indented subparagraphs where appropriate.
3. Shorter sentence length. Average words per sentence reduced from 39.6 to 18.2. "Reading ease" score improved from 10.0 to 26.7.

### IV. CONCISE ENUMERATION OF CONCLUSIONS

ORIGINAL FORM

REVISED FORM

REPRODUCED  
SECURITY INFORMATION

exports of steel and steel products are presently somewhat above international levels, it is believed that modernization of present facilities, fuller utilization of capacity, together with larger procurement of raw materials in heavy cases will bring prices down to international levels. Other commodities that Japan produces are generally competitive at the present time.

V. CONCLUSION

Because of the generally complementary nature of the Korean and Japanese economies, trade with Japan may be expected to continue to be of primary importance to Korea. Prospects of a more active trade between Japan and Korea on a commercial basis will depend to a large extent on Korea's ability to expand production in agriculture, specifically rice, and on the maintenance of rice exports. Prospects of expanding exports of other commodities are fairly good but their contribution to Korea's foreign exchange receipts would be relatively less important than that possible from rice exports. Should Korea, in the future, overcome currently still powerful political and psychological blocks against dealing with Japan, a long-range Japanese credit and investment program for purposes of development of Korea's resources might be possible, and this may far increased trade between the two countries. Japan has already made a start in this direction with the establishment of an Export Bank which has as its purpose the extension of credit to purchase of Japanese capital equipment. However, even though such a development might be desirable as a means of reducing Korea's dependence on US financed exports, at this time there appear to be no particularly strong economic incentives to induce the Japanese to embark on a large trade-credit program to Korea.

On the other hand, under a UN or UN-financed Korean Aid program, Japan is already in an excellent position to supply a substantial part of Korea's requirements.

REPRODUCED  
SECURITY INFORMATION

REPRODUCED  
SECURITY INFORMATION

C. Other Factors

1. Except for steel, the prices of Japanese commodities are generally competitive at the present time. Japan's present steel and steel products prices are somewhat above international levels. It is believed that prices will be brought down to international levels by modernization of present facilities, fuller utilization of capacity, and larger procurement of raw materials in heavy cases.

2. Powerful Korean political and psychological blocks exist against dealing with Japan. Overcoming these blocks might make possible a long-range Japanese credit and investment program to develop Korea's resources and increase trade.

3. Japan has established an Export Bank to extend credit to purchasers of Japanese capital equipment. However, at this time no strong incentive exists to induce the Japanese to embark on a large trade-credit program to Korea.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. Trade with Japan may be expected to be of primary importance to Korea because of the complementary nature of their economies.

B. The ability of Korea to export rice to Japan is the key to more active trade. The export of other commodities would be far less important.

C. Japan will probably not embark on a large trade-credit program to Korea.

D. Under a UN or UN-financed Korean aid program, Japan is clearly in an excellent position to supply a substantial part of Korea's requirements.

REPRODUCED  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Four concisely stated points instead of one long paragraph containing both conclusions and new discussion material.

**PART TWO**

**PROGRAMS OF IMPROVEMENT**

**B—TO IMPROVE THE UTILIZATION OF THE ANALYST**

- TIME-USE IMPROVEMENT
- READING RATE IMPROVEMENT
- PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT

## TIME-USE IMPROVEMENT

### THE PROBLEM

Analysts have but a fraction of their time available for the highest productive act of analysis and composition. They are subjected to interruptions which sap their energies and distract their thinking. Most significant are duties which might be partly delegated:

Background Study-----	32.2%	Percentages shown apply to Regular Program Analysts
Searching for Data-----	10.0	
Administrative Tasks-----	9.0	
Reviewing Work of Others-----	8.7	
Official Editing-----	5.5	
Total-----	<u>65.4%</u>	


### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

1. The future staffing of research divisions should be based upon supporting every analyst at GS-11 and above with a part-time Research Aide, at a ratio of 1:2 or 1:3. The advantages of this approach are important in three respects:

First, the availability of outstanding research and analysis skill is not great, and intelligence agencies must constantly seek ways of husbanding this most vital asset.

Second, the maintenance of a continuing inflow of young talent is essential to providing the reservoir from which future senior staff will be drawn, as well as to preserving the vigor which is one of R's important strengths.

Third, this approach to staffing can prove a definite economy. For example:



Such a plan of staffing can be adopted gradually as staff is expanded or as replacements occur. The development of this plan should be preceded by a detailed study leading to the development of the ideal organization for each branch.


2. It should be the objective in each Branch to minimize interruptions by concentrating special program assignments in a small number of specialists (current intelligence, IIA, TCA, etc.). This will further reduce the dispersion of effort of individual analysts.
3. While analysts should be allowed maximum flexibility in the use of their time, realistic man hour estimates and deadlines should be established to control job scope, assure timeliness, and provide a measure of rate of work. (See also page 48.)

## READING RATE IMPROVEMENT

One of the significant aids which can contribute to the proficiency of all research analysts is training to improve reading speed, accompanied in some cases by an increase in comprehension:

### BASIS OF THE PROGRAM

In essence the plan trains the eye to read in thought units rather than in words through the use of mechanical training aids:



(Photographs furnished through the courtesy of  
National Institute of Technology, Washington, D.C.)

### SOME OF THE RESULTS REPORTED

Evidence gathered from a variety of sources indicates that any willing student can improve his reading rate, no matter how good or how poor, by 30% to 100% after about 24 hours of training:

- U.S. Navy Intelligence School reports that recent experience indicates an average improvement of 50% accompanied by improved comprehension and retention of subject matter.
- CIA gives this training to all new employees and reports an average improvement of 30% with no loss in comprehension.
- The Army Adjutant General reported 100% improvement for a group of 155 students.
- Similar results found by Department of Agriculture, Air Force, Marine Corps, Bureau of Ships, Bureau of Ordnance, GW University, YWCA, and a variety of private concerns.

### THE PROPOSAL

It has been found that the Foreign Service Institute has acquired most of the equipment required and is interested in developing such training. A request from the R Area, and some assistance in organizing the program, might speed its availability to R.

The benefits to R personnel can be of significant proportions. A conservative estimate indicates that analysts alone might save one hour per day, or find it possible to increase their intake by 50% or better. Many other classes of personnel, from executive to clerical levels, should profit similarly.

## PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

### THE PROBLEM

1. The high degree of professional zeal and career interest in R underlie a strong desire among the analysts for more formal opportunities to exchange ideas and perfect techniques.
2. Our experience with other professional and academic groups indicates that this desire can be met only in part by written communications. This is confirmed in OIR by the low readership of the well-prepared Analysts' Manual.
3. The expressed interests of the analysts interviewed run the whole gamut of training possibilities, ranging from the simple desire for regular branch staff meetings to the more ambitious craving for field trips and sabbaticals.
4. A prominent basis for most requests is the desire to increase professional competence and improve the individual contribution to the Department's program.
5. It must be noted that no organized planning is taking place to meet these desires and interests.

### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

STEP ONE- Training in speed reading and in improved report preparation are the most obvious needs which can be readily met.

STEP TWO- Regular branch staff meetings should be instituted on a weekly or bi-weekly basis, and a planned program should be adopted for each, including:

- Systematic discussion of R's total program and place in the Intelligence Community (The Analysts' Manual provides the basis.).
- Systematic review of R's policies and current program.
- Systematic exposure to target users. At least once each month a Bureau officer should be invited to attend the branch staff meeting to discuss his work and R's services.

STEP THREE- Personalized and inspirational guidance to senior analysts. Equally as important as exposure to R's customers is exposure to the top leadership of R. It is recommended that Messrs. Armstrong, Howe, Evans, Buford, Trezise and Killea each spend thirty minutes a week in consultation with an R analyst, discussing his work program, interests and ideas. In this manner all analysts would see a top official in private consultation at least once each year. The morale benefits should be significant, as well as the ideas for improvement.

#### STEP FOUR—PERFORMANCE RATING

A more meaningful plan of performance evaluation can be a valuable means of recognizing good performance, correcting weaknesses, and improving supervision. It is recommended that each analyst be rated on each major project completed as follows:

ANALYST PERFORMANCE RATING		
Name _____ GS- _____ Division _____ Branch _____		
Report _____ Time Spent _____		
Factor	*Rating	Explanation
Planning The Study		
Fact Finding		
Analysis		
Report Preparation		
Consumer Relations		
Summary Rating		Rated by _____ Date Rated _____

#### \* Rating Factors

- 1 = Superior performance in rate and quality of work.
- 2 = Acceptable performance in rate and quality of work.
- 3 = Passable performance, but below standard R desires to maintain.
- 4 = Unsatisfactory performance.

One copy delivered to analyst by supervisor and discussed with him. One copy placed in permanent file.

#### STEP FIVE—LONG RANGE PROGRAM

- A "Training Coordinator" should be appointed to administer the above programs and work with branch chiefs in arranging:
- A - Bureau assignments - 6 weeks every two years on a Bureau desk for analysts at GS-12 and above.
- B - Field assignments - 6 months every five years for analysts at GS-12 and above.
- C - Executive development - Two possible candidates should be identified for each key position at branch chief level and above, and steps taken to stimulate development of supervisory and management skills.

## FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT

### THE PROBLEM


The quarters provided in SA-1 are below the standard provided personnel in other locations such as New State. The disadvantages to R analysts are:

- High noise level, disturbing to close research.
- Lack of privacy, subjecting the analyst to further disturbance.
- Congested quarters, for DRS and DRN particularly.
- Difficulty of communication with New State Building.
- Rapid accumulation of files contributing to further congestion.

Added to these undesirable features is the minimum clerical support available for files maintenance and report drafting.

### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

1. The cost of providing more satisfactory quarters for the professional staff would be well repaid in terms of increased or more sustained performance. Modern "Packaged Office Units" offer one economical approach. At a cost of



(Sketches furnished through courtesy of Globe Wernicks Co.)

approximately \$440 per analyst, and without an increase in space, analysts could be provided partitioned work spaces containing a desk, table and bookshelf. At a minimum, it is recommended that one branch be so equipped, or that a "Report Writing Room" be set up for one division - to pilot test these advantages (DRS suggested).

2. Install dictating units in this pilot test area. Our interviews indicate that perhaps one out of four analysts will use such equipment without urging, and that half may ultimately find it of value.

**PART TWO**

**PROGRAMS OF IMPROVEMENT**

**C. TO STRENGTHEN PLANNING AND CONTROL**

- **PRODUCTION PLANNING AND CONTROL**
- **PLANNING FOR ACQUISITION**

## PRODUCTION PLANNING AND CONTROL


### THE PROBLEM

1. Control over the timely completion of work, both with regard to man hour scheduling and completion-date scheduling, is the most neglected aspect of R's control.
2. This is reflected in the regular program, but is equally serious in the case of the support programs. Concern with this matter was found among the CIR/NIS Coordinator, the CIA/NIS Coordinator, and the Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence.
3. The cause of this problem lies in the commendable concentration of division and branch chiefs on program development and quality control, and the natural aversion of the professional staff to schedules and deadlines (again a typical problem with professional groups of all types, but on the whole a whole-some condition if it can be counter-balanced with workable control techniques).

### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

1. The attention devoted to production planning and control techniques by R's top management should be as vigorous and competent as that given to "professional" management (including quality control). Only thus can the confidence of budget and management groups be won, and satisfaction with timely service assured:
  - A. A top position responsible for production planning and control techniques should be appointed. The incumbent of this position should be substantively qualified, and enjoy acceptance by the professional staff.
  - B. This officer should be supported by adequate staff assistants, including the NIS Coordinator and the proposed Consumer Relations Coordinator.
2. An organized production planning and scheduling procedure should be instituted, embodying the following principles:
  - A. Semi-Annual Work Plan for each branch, leading to a firm allocation of analyst man hours by program and type of effort.
  - B. Clearance of this plan with all interested parties leading to final approval by top management.
  - C. Schedule of individual projects by man hours and completion dates.
  - D. The development of specifications for raw materials required.
  - E. Monthly report of performance against the schedule for individual projects, by each branch.
  - F. Quarterly report to management showing over-all performance against the Work Plan.

## STEPS INVOLVED IN APPLYING THE PRODUCTION PLANNING AND CONTROL PROGRAM



## PRINCIPAL RECORDS CONCERNED

FORM 1  
**WORK PLAN SUMMARY**

PROGRAM		PERIOD		BRANCH	
SUBJECT		PROJECTED MANHOUR EXPENDITURE		PERCENT OF TOTAL	
		INITIAL ESTIMATE	ADJUSTED ESTIMATE		
NIE, IE, SE and IR					
NIE PRODUCTION					
IR -					
In Progress					
Anticipated					
PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS					
IR and OTHER WRITTEN CURRENT INTELLIGENCE					
BRIEFINGS					
SPOT INQUIRY HANDLING					
SUB-TOTAL OUTPUT MANHOURS					
COMMITTEES, DEBRIEFING, ETC.					
BACKGROUND READING, MARKING FOR FILE, ETC.					
SUB-TOTAL INTAKE MANHOURS					
ADMINISTRATION INCLUDING EVALUATIONS					
TOTAL					
ESTIMATED MANHOURS AVAILABLE (From Form 1A)*					
NET OPEN TIME OR DEFICIT					
REMARKS:					

\* A Individual Work Plan is prepared for each program and supported as appropriate by detailed lists of projects showing estimated manhours required for each.

### "A". THE WORK PLAN

A budgeting of the estimated available man hours in the six-month period ahead against the several types of intelligence product, service and other activity. Prepared by program by each Branch Chief and summarized. Supported by detailed estimates, based on stated assumptions with respect to its various elements.

FORM 2  
**OIR WORK JACKET**

1A. PROJECT NUMBER		1B. PROJECT TITLE		1C. PROGRAM	
2A. REQUESTER (NAME AND OFFICE OR AGENCY)		2B. PRODUCING DIVISION/BRANCH		2C. COLLABORATING DIVISIONS (BRANCHES)	
3A. PERTINENT INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO NATURE AND TARGET USE OF PROJECT				3B. PRIMARY SUBJECT TYPE <input type="checkbox"/> POLITICAL <input type="checkbox"/> ECONOMIC <input type="checkbox"/> SOCIOLOGICAL <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	
4A. ANALYST MANHOURS ESTIMATED A. ORIGINAL ESTIMATE		4B. REVISED ESTIMATE		4C. ACTUAL	
5A. PROJECT CLASSIFICATION		5B. DATE OF PRELIMINARY REVIEW		5C. PROGRESS RECORD (1) DATE REQUESTED (2) ORIGINAL DEADLINE DATE (3) REVISION (4) (5) (6) PROJECT INITIATED (7) (8) (9) DRAFT TO REPRODUCTION (10) DATE TO REVISIT (11) DATE DISTRIBUTE (12) DISTRIBUTED	
6A. PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION ADDITIONS OR REVISIONS:		6B. BRANCH APPROVAL		6C. DIVISION APPROVAL	
7A. LEAD ANALYST'S NAME		7B. BRANCH APPROVAL		7C. DIVISION APPROVAL	
PROJECT NO.		PROJECT TITLE		PROJECT CLASSIFICATION	

(Actual size 8" x 5")

### "B". THE WORK JACKET

A master record in Kardex form prepared for each NIE, IE, SE and IR. On it is entered all basic information relative to the project's nature, origin, purpose, classification and proposed distribution. It identifies producing and collaborating units, and the name of the lead analyst, as well as the approval signature of the Branch and Division Chiefs. It also records estimated and actual man hour expenditure, date of request, and progress in terms of calendar dates. A supplementary card is used to record the expenditure of analyst hours on the project.

FORM 2A  
**PROJECT MAN-HOURS RECORD SHEET**

1A. PROJECT NUMBER		1B. PROJECT TITLE		1C. PROGRAM	
ANALYSTS ASSIGNED		PROGRAM		GRADE	
LEAD ANALYST		JAN.		FEB.	
ANALYST		MAR.		APRIL	
		MAY		JUNE	
		JULY		AUG.	
		SEPT.		OCT.	
		NOV.		DEC.	
		TOTAL			
MANHOUR SUBTOTALS					
BRANCH CHIEF AND DIVISION REVIEWERS					
MANHOUR TOTALS					
PROJECT NO.		PROJECT TITLE		PROJECT CLASSIFICATION	

(Actual size 8" x 5")

## PRINCIPAL RECORDS CONCERNED

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FORM 3

PROJECT REPORT AND SCHEDULE

PROGRAM: REGULAR DIVISION: IRF  
BRANCH: Northeast Asia

PROJECT NO. SUBJECT	TITLE	DATE REV.	COMPLETION DATE	ESTIMATE DATE	REVISIONS DATE	STATUS DATE					
						APRIL	MAY	JUNE	FUTURE		
IR 5813 S/P	ULTRANATIONALISTS, ETC.	2/78	3/74	4/73	100	100	111				
IR 5815 HA/2	OCCUPATION MEASURES, ETC.	2/78	3/74	98	72						
IR 5812 E	VIEW OF THE LAOS SITUATION	3/78	4/78	20	25						
IR 5724 E	RYZ ISSUE	3/73	5/71	25	20						
IR 5817 HA	POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH KOREA SINCE 1945			100							JULY 72
IR - 71	VULNERABILITY ESTIMATE	4/78	5/71	98	100	60					
IR - 77	CONTRIBUTION - URGENT	4/78	4/78	80	84						
IR - 78	CONTRIBUTION - HIGH			100							

LEGEND: Scheduled Completion (solid line), Actual Completion (dashed line), Deferred or Out Back (hatched), Extension (dotted line), Cancelled projects are so marked on next report.

NET TOTAL ANALYST MANHOURS AVAILABLE FOR ABOVE PROJECTS THIS PROGRAM

IN MONTH PAST: Anticipated manhours 185, Actual manhours 196, Excess or Deficit 11

IN MONTH AHEAD: Anticipated manhours 145

NOTE: If the anticipated available manhours are insufficient to meet urgent project needs in month ahead, a memorandum should be attached hereto outlining the problem and requesting management's consideration.

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### "C". THE MONTHLY PROJECT REPORT AND SCHEDULE

A tabular and graphic record of anticipated and actual performance, and of present status, with respect to NIE's, IE's, SE's and IR's. Prepared by program for each branch monthly. It also compares the past month's anticipated and actual man hours available, and indicates the anticipated man hours available in the month ahead.

FORM 4

QUARTERLY ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE

PROGRAM: REGULAR PERIOD: QUARTER BRANCH: Northeast Asia

A. COMPARISON OF PLANNED VERSUS ACTUAL APPLICATION OF ANALYST MANHOURS

SUBJECT	MANHOURS EXPENDED THIS PERIOD	NO. OF PROJECTS	PROJECTED WORK PLAN	REMARKS
IRs, IE's and SE's				
IR PRODUCTION				
IRs				
PERIODIC PUBLICATIONS				
IRs and other written current intelligence				
BRIEFINGS				
SPOT INQUIRY HANDLING				
SUBTOTAL OUTPUT HOURS				
COMMITTEES, DEBRIEFING, ETC.				
BACKGROUND READING and making for file				
SUB-TOTAL INTAKE MANHOURS				
ADMINISTRATION including mailings				
TOTAL				

B. COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED VERSUS ACTUAL TIME ALLOWANCES

FACTORS	PROJECTS COMPLETED IN THIS PERIOD	PROJECTS IN PROGRESS AT END OF PERIOD
NUMBER OF PROJECTS		
TOTAL MANHOURS EXPENDED ORIGINAL ESTIMATE		
TOTAL MANHOURS EXPENDED ACTUAL		
RATIO ESTIMATE/ACTUAL		
TOTAL ELAPSED CALENDAR DAYS ORIGINAL ESTIMATE		
TOTAL ELAPSED CALENDAR DAYS ACTUAL		
RATIO ESTIMATE/ACTUAL		

NOTE: All hours are for Analysts only.

### "D". THE QUARTERLY ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE

Record of analysts' man hours distribution by type of intelligence research product, service or other activity, and a comparison thereof with the distribution anticipated by the semi-annual Work Plan. Also, comparisons of actual versus estimated performance in terms of man hours and elapsed calendar days expended on written projects (other than CI) completed in this quarter, as well as projects in progress at the end of quarter. Prepared by program for each Branch and summarized.

## PLANNING FOR ACQUISITION

### THE PROBLEM

1. Several R agencies are directly concerned in the planning of requirements and the guidance or cultivation of sources.  
  
IAD - especially Requirements Staff and CAB - OIR divisions in varying degrees.  
BI - R/ES through its Foreign Service Program Officer.  
ERS - through its procurement of manuscripts attempts to exploit contractual research of other agencies, foundations, etc. Own funds being sought.
2. Forward planning has been handicapped by the:
  - Lack of time or initiative in OIR divisions.
  - Lack of recorded work program.
  - Consequent inability of IAD and ERS particularly to render support service.
3. The inflow of desired material to research divisions has been further limited by:
  - A. The limited coverage of the Periodic Reporting Guide Program. To date only 16 posts are being covered of the 70 to 80 which it would be advantageous to cover.
  - B. Lack of definite or comprehensive evaluation program for political and sociological reporting, both as regards individual posts and reports. Two area reviews, one for EUR and one for NEA have been made. In general, response to the idea of such evaluations was favorable.
  - C. Some Bureau officials and S-S/R recognize that some information does not reach OIR.
  - D. Present Sensitive Room deprives analysts of adequate access to some material.
4. Specific weaknesses attributable to reporting from most posts include the following:
  - A. Information too much from capital city sources and higher Government and social levels. Reporting on provinces said to be generally weak.
  - B. Popular attitudes and reactions reporting weak.
  - C. Follow through on items mentioned in Weeka not uniformly good.
  - D. Inconsistency and lack of continuity in reporting engendered by frequent shifting of Foreign Service personnel.
5. Publications procurement needs more specific representation and better coordination of efforts at the posts.  
Need for better follow-up on standing procurement requirements; phone books, official gazettes, diplomatic lists, catalogs, book lists, press guides, etc.

## THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

1. Most important first step is development of Work Plan to provide basis for both requirements planning and forward acquisition planning in specific terms.
2. A single fully-empowered staff should be established to implement a requirements planning program. To this end it is recommended that the requirements planning efforts of R/ES, ERS, and IAD be merged under one "Requirements Planning Coordinator." Incidental aspects of ERS could be lodged in IR.
3. Institute regular (annual) program of post evaluation by OIR divisions.
4. Further extend and systematize Periodic Reporting Guide Program.
5. Take action steps through the Foreign Service Institute to bolster further the training of officers going to the field.
6. Request designation at each post of a person responsible for specific attention to and coordination of publications procurement.
7. Require OIR branches to indicate most probable sources for the raw material requirements they identify.

**PART TWO**

**PROGRAMS OF IMPROVEMENT**

**D. TO SIMPLIFY PRINCIPAL WORK OPERATIONS**

- BIOGRAPHIC PROCESSING PROCEDURES
- PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLICATIONS
- CIRCULATION PROCEDURES
- DOCUMENT FLOW CONTROL
- RECORDS MANAGEMENT

## PRESENT BIOGRAPHIC PROCEDURES

### I. THE RATE OF GROWTH IS CONSIDERABLE

Last year over 148,000 documents were received by BI, from which about 420,000 cards were prepared.

### II. THE LARGEST PROPORTION OF EFFORT INVOLVED IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE FILES

The equivalent time of 6.7 analysts and 15.4 clerks is directly involved in typing and filing. Observation indicates that the typist is unable to keep abreast of the workload. In the German Section the backlog amounts to 3 file drawers and work must be sent outside.


1. Straight typing - usually one name items.
2. Out and paste - physically possible to fit onto 4 x 6 card.
3. Carbon and hecto - multiple names. Hecto averages 6 cards per stencil.

### III. BY NATURE, BIOGRAPHIC FILES ARE BASICALLY INACTIVE

There are about 2,700,000 cards now in the files covering almost 900,000 names. Approximately 85% of these names contain 3 cards or less. The ratio of names requested to names in the file was not over 4% (35,000 of 900,000) last year.

### IV. THE COST PER NAME SERVED IS HIGH

Last year information on 25,500 names was supplied on Special Activities Forms. In addition 2400 BI reports, many containing several names, were prepared. Cost approximates \$10 per name serviced, and on the basis of payroll figures about 19¢ for each card added to the files.



PRESENT BASIC FORMS

A DESPATCH

Analyzed and marked  
for file preparation.

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON  
TO: Consulate's Despatch 255, March 15, 1952.  
REF: Participation by Richard BECKER interests in Moscow Economic Conference.  
SUBJECT: [X] It is learned in the Saar that one of the German delegates to the recent Moscow Economic Conference was a Dr. UNTERSTELLER, representing the FOURMAN Company of Viernheim, Germany.

The Fourman Company is a textile enterprise and comprises one of the German subsidiaries of Richard BECKER's holding company VEREINIGTE GESELLSCHAFTEN ARNOLD BECKER m.b.H. ("VERGAB"), Saarbrücken. The FOURMAN Company is also connected with Saarbrücken, Germany.

Another subsidiary of Becker's is GEBRUDER SINN G.m.b.H., a retail clothing outlet in the Bahnhofstrasse, Saarbrücken, which is managed by the Fourmans. In the course of investigations following an application for a United States visa by Richard's son Ulrich Becker, the Consulate was informed that Gebruder Sinn had favored the Saar Communist journal "Neue Zeit" in 1948 and 1949 with "large advertisements". Ulrich Becker had been proposed as a member of an MSA Productivity Team scheduled to go to the United States April 4, 1952, but was refused a visa by me March 31, 1952.

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USSR

THE SINGLE CARD

SAAR  
CONFIDENTIAL  
rpt April 19, 1952  
UNTERSTELLER, (Dr.)  
BECKER, Richard BECKER, Ulrich 23-X 13-A-USSR

It is learned in the Saar that one of the German delegates to the recent Moscow Economic Conference was a Dr. UNTERSTELLER, representing the FOURMAN Company of Viernheim, Germany.

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D-291, Strasbourg, Apr. 19, 1952 wk May 2, 1952

THE CARBON SET

SAAR  
CONFIDENTIAL  
rpt April 19, 1952  
UNTERSTELLER, (Dr.)  
BECKER, Richard BECKER, Ulrich 23-X 13-A-USSR

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D-291, Strasbourg, Apr. 19, 1952 wk May 2, 1952

THE HECTOGRAPH MASTER

SAAR  
CONFIDENTIAL  
rpt April 19, 1952  
UNTERSTELLER, (Dr.)  
BECKER, Richard BECKER, Ulrich 23-X 13-A-USSR


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D-291, Strasbourg, Apr. 19, 1952 wk May 2, 1952

## PROPOSED BIOGRAPHIC PROCEDURES



UNTERSTELLER, (DR.) 23-X, 13-A, USSR

SAAR  
C-4/19/52

This is a Sample of a  
**FILMSORT JACKET**  
PATENTS PENDING

A sample of a Filmsort Jacket, showing a film strip with frames containing various patterns and textures. The film strip is divided into several frames, each displaying a different visual effect, such as vertical lines, horizontal lines, and abstract patterns. The first frame on the left is labeled '114012'.

<b>32</b>		<b>DECLASSIFIED</b>		<b>7</b>
		<b>EX-100</b>		<b>AF 402044</b>
<b>AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT</b>				
Biographical records of Air Commodore R. E. Bennett and Group Captain D. M. Edwards, RAF				
Date: <b>1952</b>		Section of the Air Attache, Ottawa, Canada.		
<b>21 January 1952</b>		<b>2 February 1952</b>		<b>A-2</b>
In Re: <b>BENNETT, Lt Colonel, RAF, Capt. A.S.</b>		See: <b>N/A</b>		
<b>22 JAN -21 dated 20 October 1951</b>		See: <b>RAF</b>		
REMARKS: Latest source received by report. Other references as per attached paragraph. All references to this file. Sign last report in AF Form 100 - Part 2.				
In respect to the reference there are attached hereto two copies of biographical records on the following named RAF officers:				
Air Commodore R. E. Bennett				
Group Captain D. M. Edwards				
Group Captain Edwards was appointed Director of Air Intelligence at Headquarters, RCAF, in November 1951.				
Air Commodore Bennett was appointed air member, Canadian Joint Staff, and Air Attache, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D. C. in December 1951.				
<b>ATTACHMENT</b>				
<b>F. A. PILLEY</b> Colonel, WAAF Air Attache		<b>HUGHES H. GIBSON</b> Lt Colonel, WAAF Asst. Air Attache		

10/82  
W (10-11)

2 (of 2) (of each)

## THE PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLICATIONS

Two units within OLI share responsibility for the procurement, receipt, check-in, distribution and follow-up of periodicals, serials, and newspapers. It is believed that a possible reduction of 7 to 8 out of 41 positions can be made by integrating the Selection and Records Section of IR and the Civilian Agencies Branch of IAD. These savings would arise from the following:

### 1. SAVINGS AVAILABLE BY ORGANIZATION REVISIONS 4-5 Positions

- A. Elimination of Section Chief (1)
- B. Eliminate Receiving Unit of S&R (1-2)

Combination of the two units will make unnecessary a subsidiary receiving point since materials can be routed direct to catalogers, circulation.

- C. Eliminate one of two supervisors of the Procurement Unit (1)
- D. Eliminate one of two Distribution supervisors (1)

### 2. SAVINGS AVAILABLE DUE TO WORK DUPLICATION 2 Positions

- A. Eliminate duplicate recording (8,000 to 10,000 items month) (1)
- B. Eliminate duplicate filing and follow-up (1)  
and pool clerical personnel

### 3. SAVINGS AVAILABLE THROUGH WORK SIMPLIFICATION 1 Position

- A. Discontinue recording of newspapers received in one copy only at the central point, by depending upon ultimate receiver to initiate follow-up in case item fails to arrive. (Avoid over 30,000 recordings per month.)
- B. Simplify posting of receipts on multiple copy publications received complete in one shipment, by use of single posting in lieu of multiple entries.

## CIRCULATION PROCEDURES

The average time required to secure a book from the stacks has been found to be 4 hours, 15 minutes. Almost one hour (56 minutes) elapses between preparation of the request in SA-1 and receipt of the request in the stack area:

The following steps should expedite Circulation Service:

1. Install Teletype equipment for communication between SA-1 and the two stack locations (\$95 month) to achieve simultaneous recording and receipt of the request, saving up to one hour in transmission.
2. Place the jeep service on a more flexible basis. Half of all deliveries are to SA-1, indicating that one jeep might make more frequent round trips between stacks and this location.
3. Enforce a reasonable recall procedure, such as one month on books and two weeks on periodicals. Of 315 requests studied, 37 $\frac{1}{2}$ % could not be met until recall action was initiated.
4. One to two positions can be saved by consolidation of stacks in one location (Old Post Office).

## LR REFERENCE OFFICERS

Seven Reference officers have been assigned to research divisions by LR under the NIS Support Program. Study of the use of the personnel reveals that only DRN and DRW have made effective use of this assistance. In other divisions the Reference Officer has been diverted to files maintenance and document routing: DRA - 90%; DRF - 60%; DRS - 70%; DFI - 90%; BI - 68%. This program thus appears wasteful at present. Its conversion to the "Research Aide" program is urged. (See page 42.)

## DOCUMENT FLOW CONTROL

### THE PROBLEM

The reading and routing of incoming cables, despatches, reports, etc. is one of the extensive procedural tasks of R, involving not only IAD but the research divisions as well. The following factors challenge attention:

- Documents are routed to the divisions from seven points distributed among five organizations (IR, PCS, MC, CLB, MLB).
- Uniform routing procedures are not employed within the research divisions where routing is completed.
- Routing is a function performed by 58 individuals (part time) throughout the research divisions.
- 67 routing records were found, about half overlapping.
- Only six branches weed material prior to branch distribution.
- Analysts and some Departmental personnel were found concerned that materials (including sensitive) do not reach analyst as quickly as the Bureau desk.

### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

Present plans of IAD to expedite processing appear well conceived. In addition,

1. Create one documents distribution center in IAD to process or supervise the initial receipt and distribution of all materials (except publications).
  - A. Sensitive Room - Reduce number of pieces held by selective distribution under close control.
  - B. Ticker Room - Bring under jurisdiction of IAD. Eliminate separate telegram routing.
  - C. Integrate other specialized reading and routing within IAD (MC, CLB, MLB) to secure benefits of uniformity and specialization.
2. Organize readers along area lines in order that routing may be accomplished directly to the branch level to the fullest possible extent.
  - Ten readers would be available in an integrated organization.
  - Specialization would contribute to better liaison with branches.
  - Advance training and distribution guides--development would be necessary, however.
3. Consider conducting R's review and distribution decision on despatches prior to reading panel review, in the interest of greater speed.
4. Establish in each branch of CIR a uniform plan of screening, recording and routing documents, with the objective of pin-point routing to the analyst after proper screening by Branch Current Intelligence Officer (page 36). This program is an integral part of the "Research Aide" approach (page 42). It has been reviewed in concept with one major branch where its application is considered practicable and advantageous.

## RECORDS MANAGEMENT

### THE PROBLEM

R Area now has 1,867 files of all types.  
This equipment occupies 15,869 square feet - 17% of total (equals 128 desks).  
Last year 100 cabinets were added in research areas (850 square feet).  
Filing practices - guiding, folders, cross indexing, etc., not uniform.  
Record retention, weeding, storage programs still in developmental stage.

### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

1. Establish a vigorous records management program under the direction of a full-time "Records Management Officer."
2. Select this Officer for knowledge of filing systems, to the end that uniform practices in detail can be inaugurated.
3. Establish record retention schedules and uniform weeding, destruction and storage practices. (Storage space cost only 20% of cost of office space.)
4. Develop and apply a systematic files weeding program throughout R to achieve the benefits already demonstrated in DRA and China Branch. Also review possibilities of reducing shelf storage.
5. Adopt plan of replacing four-drawer cabinets with five-drawer cabinets to conserve space occupied (approximately 2,380 square feet possible).

## PART TWO

### PROGRAMS OF IMPROVEMENT

#### E—TO PERFECT THE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

Professional organizations of all kinds (natural science, social science, engineering, legal, etc.) present an unusual problem to the management planner. The dynamic character of their work militates against the adoption of a fixed pattern of management and rigid assignments of authority and responsibility. Thus top management in such organizations must choose that pattern at any given time which achieves the desired emphasis between quality and production control, and must remain flexible in altering the pattern as the need for a different emphasis arises. This principle was applied, we believe, when the R/ES was established. This particular device has had an important influence on the sound development of the R Area. Today, however, and for the next phase of development, still another emphasis on management control appears desirable.

## AN APPROACH TO STRONGER TOP ORGANIZATION

### FOUR TYPES OF MANAGEMENT ARE REQUIRED

1. Policy - Including relationships at the highest levels in the Department and the IAC.
2. Professional - Including long-range program development, the exercise of comprehensive quality review, and the periodic assessment of the adequacy and accuracy of intelligence products, particularly those concerned with interpretation and estimating.
3. Control - Including the techniques of developing work plans; the procedures of recording, clearing and approving such plans; the systematic scheduling and progressing of such plans; the translation of plans into resource requirements; the evaluation of consumer reaction to the full range of services offered and the initiation of plans to improve use of services.
4. Services - Including those concerned with (1) procurement, receipt and distribution of incoming materials, (2) the reproduction and distribution of written products, (3) the provision of librarial and reference services, (4) the provision of budget, personnel and housekeeping services.

### THE "GAPS" IN PRESENT TOP MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

1. Policy and Professional Management are the most strongly implemented, although
  - Opportunities appear to exist with regard to strengthening guidance from Top Policy levels.
  - Program planning for areas not covered by EG and NIS not formally practiced.
2. Control Management is the weakest aspect of top management (see pages 26 and 27):
  - Scheduling and follow-up neglected on effort not covered by EG and NIS. The "Work Jacket" procedure has received only token compliance.
  - NIS coordination has lacked authority and effectiveness.
  - Requirements planning has suffered from the absence of detailed program planning.
  - Evaluation of consumer reaction has not been systematically applied.
3. Services Management is completely covered in top management but its impact is believed weakened by dispersion among three segments of organization (R/NS, PCS, OLI).

### THE SOLUTION IN PRINCIPLE

Three degrees of improvement warrant consideration:


Plan One - Strengthened Control Element - At a minimum it is urged that a Deputy OIR for "Production Coordination" be established with a direct channel to the branches through Assistant Division Chiefs for Production. To perform four control functions noted. Estimates Group strengthened by "Intelligence Consultants" and Current Intelligence Coordinator.

Plan Two - Strengthened Service and Control Elements - Still another advantage can be achieved by bringing support activities into more effective relationship with Research Divisions, and providing them a clear channel to the Research Branches through the Administrative Officers. This is accomplished by merging R/NS, OLI and IDR services.


Plan Three - Maximum Participation of All Elements - If the "General Managership" role can be assumed by the Deputy Special Assistant, it would then be possible to relieve the Director OIR of the full burden for Services and Control Management, leaving him completely free for Professional Management.

## FOUR PATTERNS OF TOP MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

THE PRESENT PATTERN



STRENGTHENED CONTROL ELEMENT




Indicates Principal Revisions Proposed

Command Line

Line of Communication


STRENGTHENED SERVICE AND CONTROL ELEMENTS

Revised Plan Two



MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION OF ALL ELEMENTS

Revised Plan Three




### ACTIONS REQUIRED TO CONVERT TO REVISED PLAN THREE

1. STRENGTHEN THE TEAMWORK ON INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH PLANNING AT THE TOP POLICY LEVELS IN THE DEPARTMENT AND AMONG THE IAC AGENCIES  
Broaden participation at Top Policy Levels (C, G, S/P, Assistant Secretaries) through invitation to collaborate with R in periodic review of the intelligence research program, its content and effectiveness. Invite similar participation by appropriate executives in IAC Agencies to exchange plans and program ideas.
2. ESTABLISH UNDER THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TWO PRINCIPAL LINE OFFICERS AND TWO STAFF OFFICERS
  - A. In the line command - (1) The Deputy Special Assistant to provide continuing daily leadership to all phases of R Area operations other than SPS; (2) A Director of Intelligence Research to have complete command authority as at present over research, including the formulation of all programs of research; full responsibility for quality, content and accuracy; and final authority over the selection and use of professional personnel.
  - B. In staff relationships - (1) A Director of Production Coordination to develop techniques of preparing work plans; procedures for clearing, approving, scheduling and reporting progress on work plans; procedures for the forward planning of raw materials requirements; plans for the use of R's personnel and fiscal resources; and to conduct surveys of the users and uses of R's products; (2) A Director of Intelligence Services to provide common services to the research divisions, and to others as required, in the procurement and distribution of materials; the furnishing of librarial and reference services; and the rendering of personnel and executive services including funds procurement and budget administration.
3. STRENGTHEN THE ESTIMATES GROUP AS THE TOP PROGRAM AND QUALITY CONTROL ARM OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
  - A. Appoint all members of this Group as Intelligence Consultants to Assistant Secretary and Top Policy Levels. Include the CPI in this Group.
  - B. Transfer Current Intelligence Coordinator to this Group with stronger responsibility for leadership of the program.
  - C. Add a full-time staff member to conduct studies of the adequacy and accuracy of estimates, from a "hind-sight" point of view.
4. ASSIGN FOUR STAFF FUNCTIONS TO THE DIRECTOR OF PRODUCTION COORDINATION
  - A. Program Planning Coordinator - To devise techniques of work planning and progress reporting and develop plans for the proper use of R's personnel and fiscal resources.
  - B. NIS Coordinator - To perform the same functions for the NIS Program.
  - C. Requirements Planning Coordinator - To devise procedures for forward planning and assist in their implementation, including exploitation of external research.
  - D. Consumer Relations Coordinator - To conduct continuing study of relationships, plan improved programs, and develop standards relating the "merchandising" of R's products and services.
5. DELEGATE ALL SUPPORTING SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE SECOND STAFF OFFICIAL  
The acquisition and distribution of raw materials; liaison functions; procurement and distribution of publications; librarial and reference services; reproduction and distribution of products; budget administration; personnel services including training arrangements; work simplification; other administrative services.
6. IN ADDITION TO PROFESSIONAL ADVISERS, ESTABLISH TWO STAFF ASSISTANTS TO EACH DIVISION CHIEF
  - A. An Assistant Chief for Production, whose staff would include the editors, and who would administer planning, scheduling, progress reporting and resource planning for the division.
  - B. An Administrative Officer to be responsible for the full range of intelligence services required.
7. PLACE FUNCTIONAL COORDINATORS IN THE DIVISION OF FUNCTIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
Including CPI Staff, TCA, EDAC, Central Asia Committee, Sociological Affairs, Geographer.

## DETAILED PORTRAYAL—REVISED PLAN THREE

To Show Principal Management Elements



— Command Line  
- - - Line of Communication

(Functional Coordinators to be lodged in DFI. The CFI to be Intelligence Consultant.)

**PART THREE**

**SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

**PLAN OF ACTION**

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### FINDINGS

An intensive five-months study of the Administration of Intelligence in the Department of State has been conducted from the following points of view:

Through the Eyes of R's Consumers - it has been found that R has made major progress in securing acceptance for, and establishing the value of its services throughout the Department. However, no Bureau is completely satisfied with the present degree or manner of service, and 3 out of 4 consumers contacted were found to be interested in improvements which will make greater use possible.

Through the Eyes of R's Producers (The Analysts) - it has been found that the competence of the professional staff is outstanding and that morale is high. Better utilization of the rare analytical skill--the ability to think deeply--has been found possible by fewer interruptions, more opportunity for professional development and more satisfactory facilities.

Through the Eyes of R's Administrators - it has been found that two-thirds of their time is devoted to duties other than working with subordinates; that forward planning of program and raw material requirements, as well as production control are incomplete; that the organization structure militates against the highest effectiveness of top executives.

In order to act upon these findings, a five-fold program, consisting of 35 principal actions, has been proposed:

#### A. TO IMPROVE CONSUMER RELATIONS

1. Appoint an "Intelligence Consultant" to the Assistant Secretary of each Bureau (drawing upon the OIR Division Chiefs and other key executives) to advise with and secure the views of top Bureau officials regarding R's major program of research and estimates.
2. Establish the position of "Consumer Relations Coordinator" to conduct continuing studies of the users and uses of R's products and services, and to evaluate adequacy of services provided. (Similar periodic audits by a representative of the A Area should also be considered.)
3. Secure more active, continuing guidance and support from top policy officials within the Department, and from leaders of other IAC agencies, in the forward planning of R's major research and estimates program.
4. Inaugurate a program of individual indoctrination of new Bureau officials, and of present officials who are uninformed of R's role and services.
5. Expand bibliographic and reference services to the Department through direct study of desk officer requirements and the publication of "tailored bibliographies" of R's products and principal holdings in each area and subject matter field.

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6. Adopt a policy of distribution to target users at the earliest possible date, emphasizing personalized service and regulating broader distribution on the basis of "interest and value" or the necessity for securing attention.
7. Establish the position of "Classification Control Officer" to provide continuing attention to the proper classification of written products, with the objective of avoiding overclassification which restricts use, particularly for the information program.
8. Secure stronger leadership for the Current Intelligence program by transferring the Coordinator to the Estimates Group Staff, vesting authority in this position to instruct divisions as to subjects warranting Current Intelligence treatment.
9. Explore thoroughly the respective roles of State and CIA with respect to Current Intelligence, with the objective of avoiding duplication and perhaps of concentrating State Department's attention on items on which it can make a unique or truly significant contribution.
10. Inaugurate an aggressive program for improving the readability of R's products through more attention to features of style and format. This will contribute to greater use as well as conserve the reader's time. In this connection, appoint a well-qualified editor in each division, and develop training guides for editors and analysts.

### B. TO IMPROVE THE UTILIZATION OF THE ANALYST

1. Base the future staffing of research branches on the objective of supporting analysts at GS-11 and above with part-time research aides in a ratio of 1:2 or 1:3. In this connection, undertake the development of an ideal table of organization for each division through the technique of staff planning described.
2. Concentrate special program assignments in each branch in a small number of analysts to avoid the dispersion of such efforts among all analysts. This is particularly desirable in connection with Current Intelligence and document review, and should be accomplished in part through the revised program of document flow control.
3. Provide instruction in reading rate improvement, utilizing equipment which has been acquired by, and the facilities of, the Foreign Service Institute.
4. Inaugurate a thorough-going program of professional development including:
  - a. Regular branch meetings to be attended from time to time by Bureau officials.
  - b. Personal inspirational guidance to senior analysts, to be supplied through planned consultations with top R executives.
  - c. A plan of performance evaluation specifically designed to measure the elements which contribute to performance by research analysts.

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- d. A long-range training program based upon definite policies with respect to Bureau assignments, field trips and executive development.
5. Establish the position of "Training Coordinator" to develop plans for the above program of professional development and to assist in its administration.
6. Provide privacy and quieter quarters, at least for report writing purposes, by the installation of packaged office units and the furnishing of dictating equipment to those who will use it.

### C. TO STRENGTHEN CONTROLS

1. Inaugurate a semi-annual "Work Planning Procedure" for all OIR branches, fully supported by schedules of projects planned and in process, and including a complete system of clearances with all interested officials in R, elsewhere in the Department and among customer agencies as appropriate.
2. Appoint a "Program Planning Coordinator" at the Office level to develop techniques for this Work Planning and take initiative in securing effectuation.
3. Utilize this Work Plan as the basis for current project scheduling and status review, and institute a revised system of performance reports to management.
4. Use this Work Plan as a principal basis for the forward planning of requirements, including the fuller exploitation of external research. In this connection create the position of "Requirements Planning Coordinator" at the Office level to unite the several efforts now concerned with requirements planning in IAD, ERS and R/ES.
5. Create a "Production Coordination Staff" at the Office level, under a substantively qualified officer supported by the Program Planning Coordinator, NIS Coordinator, Requirements Planning Coordinator, and Consumer Relations Coordinator.
6. At the division level, designate an Assistant Chief (Production) to implement the following controls: (1) work planning, (2) project scheduling, (3) requirements planning, (4) NIS coordination, (5) consumer relations planning, (6) editorial review and (7) the proper use of resources.

### D. TO SIMPLIFY PRINCIPAL WORK OPERATIONS

1. Install, at least on a pilot basis, the microfilm technique of processing documents for the biographic records. Potential savings of 13 positions indicated.
2. Create an integrated documents distribution center in IAD, to process or supervise the receipt and distribution of all incoming materials except books and serials. In this connection reduce the number of documents retained in the Sensitive Room.

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3. Establish a single Publications Division to eliminate the duplication which now occurs between IAD and IR, and to provide better control over procurement and distribution. Savings of 7-8 positions indicated.
4. Expedite circulation service by the installation of teletype communication with the stacks, and by more flexible use of the jeep service.
5. Strengthen records management by the institution of a vigorous records retention program, improved filing practices and the use of 5-drawer filing equipment. Potential space savings 4,000 square feet.

### E. TO PERFECT THE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

Secure a better balance of emphasis among the "policy," "professional," "control" and "services" aspects of top management through the following steps:

1. Strengthen the teamwork on intelligence research planning at the top policy levels in the Department, and among the IAC agencies.
2. Establish under the Special Assistant two principal line officers and two principal staff officers: (1) The line Deputy Special Assistant to provide daily leadership over the internal operations of the R Area; (2) A line Director of Intelligence Research to exercise full professional management; (3) A staff Director of Production Coordination to develop techniques of work planning and control and assist in their implementation; (4) A staff Director of Intelligence Services to provide common services to the research divisions, and to other users in the Department and the Intelligence Community as required.
3. Strengthen the Estimates Group as the top program and quality control arm of the Director of Intelligence Research.
4. Assign four staff functions to the Director of Production Coordination; Program Planning Coordinator, NIS Coordinator, Requirements Planning Coordinator, Consumer Relations Coordinator.
5. Delegate all supporting service responsibilities to the Director of Intelligence Services: IAD, IR, Publications Procurement and Distribution, Reproduction and Distribution, and Executive-type services (budget, personnel, training, work simplification and administrative services).
6. In addition to professional advisers, establish two staff assistants to each division chief: (1) An Assistant Chief for Production described above; and (2) An Administrative Officer to be responsible for the full range of intelligence services required at the branch level.
7. Place functional coordinators in the Division of Functional Intelligence, including the CPI Staff, TCA coordination, EDAC coordination, Central Asia Committee, Sociological Affairs Adviser, and the Geographer.
8. Revise techniques of communications (meetings, manuals and reports) to focus attention on the evaluation of performance and the initiation of steps to secure corrective action.

## PLAN OF ACTION

The recommendations outlined in the foregoing constitute a master blue print, many of whose details must be evolved on a test basis over an extended period of time. While Volume II of this report describes at greater length the individual steps now anticipated, continued planning by management will be essential to the attainment of the basic objectives proposed. To this end a Four-Phase plan of installation, requiring 18 to 24 months for full implementation, is proposed:

### PHASE 1—PLANNING FOR INSTALLATION (THREE MONTHS)

In the weeks immediately following receipt of the report, it is considered essential that top management become thoroughly acquainted with the philosophy and objectives of the proposals and reach agreement on the principles to be supported, rather than on details of implementation. To this end, it is suggested that:

1. The Special Assistant, Deputy Special Assistant, Office Directors and Director Executive Staff study and discuss the report and agree upon the principles to which support can be given, prior to broader distribution.
2. The conclusions of this group should then be submitted concurrently to:
  - a. The Deputy Under Secretary - Administration with a request that appropriate Departmental officials be asked to review the report as a whole and the preliminary conclusions of top R executives.
  - b. The Director of Central Intelligence for comment on those matters of interest and concern to the Intelligence Community, particularly current intelligence relationships and responsibilities.
  - c. The Division Chiefs of OIR and OLI for preliminary review and comment.
3. Upon receipt of views from these sources an "Installation Planning Committee" should be appointed, consisting of representatives from the R Area and one or more designees of the Deputy Under Secretary - Administration (representing budget, personnel and management interests), to formulate plans for installing a revised organization. The conclusion of Phase 1 should occur with the announcement of the revised organization plan and the designation of an incumbent for each new position.

### PHASE 2—ORGANIZING FOR INSTALLATION (THREE MONTHS)

At the outset of Phase 2, the Installation Planning Committee should request the officials of the revised organization to prepare in detail a plan and schedule of installation setting out:

1. Recommendations to be implemented or tested during Phase 3.
2. Additional actions not covered in the report to be taken during Phase 3.
3. Recommendations and additional actions to be implemented in Phase 4.

## PLAN OF ACTION

4. Recommendations to be deferred pending further study.

Each executive should develop and submit the above program to the Installation Planning Committee within 60 days and counsel with the Committee on individual items and their relative priority of importance. After individual plans have been developed and reviewed with the Committee, each should be submitted to the Special Assistant and the Deputy Under Secretary - Administration for approval. By the end of Phase 2 the Installation Planning Committee should be disbanded and future supervision of installation provided by the Deputy Special Assistant. However, periodic progress reports should be submitted to the Special Assistant and by him to the Deputy Under Secretary - Administration.

### PHASE 3—INITIAL INSTALLATION AND TESTING (SIX MONTHS)

During this interval the most important actions in connection with each program of improvement should proceed:

1. With respect to improving consumer relations, action should be taken to appoint Intelligence Consultants, establish the Consumer Relations Coordinator, introduce revisions in report style and format, activate the classification control procedure, and revise the Current Intelligence Program.
2. With respect to improving the utilization of analysts, the professional development program should be inaugurated giving first attention to branch meetings; one branch should be fully studied and the research aide program installed; a pilot installation of packaged office units and dictating equipment should be completed.
3. With respect to improving planning and control - each branch should complete its first semi-annual Work Plan and begin the application of this plan to project scheduling and requirements planning.
4. With respect to methods improvement - circulation service should be improved as outlined; the organizational aspects of document control and publications procurement should be completed; and the Records Management Officer should be appointed; and an experimental installation of microfilming made in BI.

### PHASE 4—FINAL INSTALLATION (TWELVE MONTHS)

Based upon the results secured during Phase 3, detailed implementation should proceed with respect to all phases. Shortly after the beginning of Phase 4 an audit of installation progress and survey results should be made, drawing upon outside counsel. A period of two weeks should be sufficient to accomplish this audit.

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V.	CLASSIFICATION CONTROL
VI.	CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
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IX.	IMPROVED USE OF THE TIME OF ANALYSTS
X.	READING RATE IMPROVEMENT
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XII.	IMPROVED FACILITIES FOR RESEARCH ANALYSIS
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